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THE FRAGILITY OF GOOD IDEAS: A CASE FOR
ABOLISHING SUNSET REVIEW OF FLORIDA'S MOTOR
VEHICLE MANUFACTURER LICENSING STATUTE
BARBARA BALZER*
"How did I get here? Somebody pushed me. Somebody must have
set me off in this direction and clusters of other hands must have
touched themselves to the controls at various times, for I would not
have picked this way for the world."'
S TATE regulation of the practice of a profession or an occupation
by the imposition of licensing requirements is designed to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of the public from significant and dis-
cernible harm.2 Such regulation is not intended to regulate members
of an industry so as to adversely and unreasonably affect the competi-
tive market.3 The Regulatory Sunset Act, section 11.61, Florida Stat-
utes, provides for the systematic repeal, or sunset, of those statutes
which regulate the initial entry into and continued practice of certain
professions, occupations, businesses, and industries.4 Each such stat-
ute is scheduled for automatic repeal unless, pursuant to an orderly
review, it is found that the statute should be reenacted by the Legisla-
ture in the public interest.5
Sections 320.60 through 320.71, Florida Statutes, 6 regulating motor
vehicle manufacturers, factory branches, distributors, and importers,
have been subject to sunset review twice since the Regulatory Reform
* Legislative Analyst, Florida Senate, Committee on Economic, Community and Con-
sumer Affairs, 1984-1988. B.A., 1974; J.D. 1979, University of Iowa. The views expressed in
this Article are those of the author and are not intended to reflect the views of the Florida
Senate.
1. J. HELLBR.
2. FLA. STAT. § 11.61(2)(a) (1987).
3. Id. § 11.61(2)(b).
4. Id. § 11.61(2)(c).
5. Id.
6. Id. §§ 320.60-.71.
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Act was enacted in 1976, once in 19807 and again in 1988.8 Twice the
sunset review has resulted in the recommendation that the statute be
allowed to repeal as not in the public interest. Twice the Legislature
has not only disregarded the recommendation to repeal, but has en-
acted a bill which expands the state's regulation of motor vehicle man-
ufacturers.
This Article is prompted by the recent contrary use of the sunset
review process by motor vehicle dealers to greatly increase the state's
regulation of motor vehicle manufacturers to the benefit of new mo-
tor vehicle dealers and to the detriment of purchasers. It is also
prompted by the refusal of the 1988 Legislature to allow the motor
vehicle statute to repeal as scheduled. If the Legislature's refusal had
been an isolated and lone response to such recommendation, the deci-
sion would not be so troubling. Combined with a similar refusal in
1980, however, and a 1988 sunset bill comprised mostly of a lengthy
motor vehicle dealer-drafted amendment which greatly restricted the
conduct of motor vehicle manufacturers, a disturbing pattern
emerges.
It is the thesis of this Article that the sunset review process, as it
relates to motor vehicle manufacturers specifically, 9 is not being used
for its intended purpose of examining regulatory programs enacted to
protect the public from incompetent or fraudulent practitioners and
unnecessary regulation. Instead, the process has resulted in a periodic
state-sponsored forum wherein the motor vehicle dealers augment ex-
isting special interest legislation with similar legislation which, but for
the sunset year, might neither be proposed by the motor vehicle deal-
ers nor likely be entertained by the Legislature.
7. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON TRANSP., A REVIEW OF SECTIONS 320.60-320.70, FLORIDA
STATUTES, MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS, FACTORY BRANCHES, FACTORY REPRESENTATIVES,
DISTRIBUTORS, IMPORTERS (Feb. 1980) [hereinafter 1980 SUNSET REVIEW] (on file with commit-
tee).
8. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON ECON., COMM'Y & CONS. AFFAIRS, A REvmw OF SECTIONS
320.27-.31, FLORIDA STATUTES, RELATING TO MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS and SECTIONS 320.60-.71,
FLORIDA STATUTES, RELATING TO MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS, FACTORY BRANCHES, DIS-
TRIBUTORS AND IMPORTERS (Apr. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 SUNSET REVIEW] (on file with commit-
tee).
9. In the 1987-1988 interim, Senate President Vogt, Dem., Merritt Island, 1974-1988, di-
rected the Florida Senate Committee on Governmental Operations to review both the sunset and
sundown laws, sections 11.61 and 11.611, Florida Statutes, and to evaluate the effectiveness of
the reviews. Upon finding such reviews costly and the benefits intangible and unquantifiable, the
staff recommended scheduling the sunset and sundown laws themselves for automatic repeal in
1992 subject to prior legislative review and creating statutory criteria to guide such review. Sen-
ate Bill 1057, containing those recommendations, passed 31 to 0 in the Senate but died in the
House of Representatives Committee on Regulatory Reform. FLA. S. JOUR. 568 (Reg. Sess. May
31, 1988); STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON GovTL. OPs., A REvIEw OF THE SUNSET AND SUNDOWN
LAWS IN FLORIDA 5-7, 89-90 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter SENATE REVIEW OF SUNSET].
SUNSET REVIEW
This Article includes an explanation of the sunset review process; a
history of the motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer relationship; a his-
tory of the Florida statute regulating motor vehicle manufacturers;
and a discussion of the relevant economic studies, Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) comments, sunset reviews and performance audits
published in Florida and other states in the 1980-1988 sunset interim.
It also examines the 1980 and 1988 legislative sunset reviews, the re-
commendations to repeal resulting from those reviews, and the Legis-
lature's response not only to reenact the statute, but, at the urging of
the motor vehicle dealers, to increase the state's regulation of motor
vehicle manufacturers. Finally, the Article concludes with a recom-
mended resolution of the problem created by the Legislature's re-
peated response.
I. THE HISTORY OF SUNSET REVIEW IN FLORIDA
The Regulatory Sunset Act of 1976, section 11.61, Florida Stat-
utes, 0 established a formal process for the periodic, systematic, legis-
lative review of statutes which regulate professions, occupations,
businesses, and industries in Florida." The purpose of the review is to
examine the need for, and benefits derived from, such regulatory acts
to the public. If a review establishes that the public benefits from the
regulation, the statute can be reenacted as is or as amended, which-
ever is appropriate. If, however, a review establishes that there is little
or no public benefit or protection derived from a particular state regu-
latory statute, the statute can be allowed to repeal. The sunset process
is unique in that it mandates that the regulation of the occupation end
on a specified date unless the Legislature positively affirms the need
for continued regulation by passing new legislation. 12 The burden of
10. FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1976).
11. Florida became the second state to enact sunset legislation following Colorado. The
concept of a systematic periodic repeal of designated statutes was first proposed by former
United States Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, then Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Justice Douglas suggested to President Franklin Roosevelt that every
federal agency be abolished after 10 years. Otherwise, Douglas warned, the regulatory agencies
would be captured by the very industries they were established to regulate. In 1969, Cornell
University Professor Theodore J. Lowi proposed a 5- to 10-year limit on the life of every legisla-
tive act which "may ultimately be the only effective way to get substantive evaluation of a pro-
gram and an agency." STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON GoVTL. OPS., MANUAL OF INSTRUCTION FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 203 (Mar. 1977); FLA. S.
Comm. ON GovTL. Ops., 1986 SUNSET/SUNDOWN HANDBOOK AND OTHER LEcaSLATIVE REPEALS 2
(Feb. 1987) [hereinafter SUNSET HANDBOOK] (on file with committee).
12. Unlike sunset review, which provides an after-the-fact review of a previously enacted
regulatory law, sunrise review requires a before-the-fact review of the alleged benefits of the
proposed regulation of an unregulated profession. This relatively new procedure typically re-
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proof is on those seeking reenactment of the regulation and not on
those seeking its repeal.
A. The Sunset Process
The Regulatory Reform Act, as amended, established a cycle not to
exceed six years for the automatic repeal and the legislative review of
regulatory statutes.'3 The Act provided that programs scheduled for
termination under the Act could not be reestablished for more than
six years and any program created to regulate the entry into any pro-
fession, occupation, business, industry, or other endeavor would be
subject to the same automatic six year repeal and review.' 4 Sunset re-
views were conducted under this Act in 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981.
These included, in 1980, the review of sections 320.60 through 320.70,
the statute relating to motor vehicle manufacturers, factory branches,
factory representatives, distributors, and importers.' 5
In 1981, the Regulatory Reform Act was repealed and a revision,
the Regulatory Sunset Act, was enacted as section 11.61 .6 The reviews
quired asking questions similar to those included in the sunset review process, including whether
there is recognizable harm to the public from nonregulation, and what the potential benefit to
the public from regulation would be. A significant feature of sunrise is that the burden is on the
group seeking regulation to demonstrate the need for such regulation. In sunset the burden to
demonstrate the need for such regulation is on those seeking reenactment of the existing regula-
tion. Critics of the sunset process note that the focus of the process is generally on improving the
effectiveness of the existing regulation and not its elimination. Three states, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, and North Carolina, have nonetheless repealed their sunset laws altogether. THE CoUN-
CIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, LEXINGTON, Ky., STATE SUNRISE PROGRAMS: DECIDING WHEN TO
REGULATE HEALTH PROFESSIONS, NATIONAL CLEARnGHOUSE ON LICENSURE, ENFORCEMENT AND
REGULATION 3 (1986).
Four similar bills seeking to implement sunrise review in Florida have been proposed between
1981 and 1986: SB 857 and HB 875 in 1981; CS for SB 199 in 1982; SB 1029 in 1985; and SB 50
in 1986. Although the bills have been acted on favorably by different substantive committees,
none has successfully passed both houses and become law. Currently, bills proposing the regula-
tion of previously unregulated professions are handled as any other bill.
In 1987, the Florida Senate Committee on Economic, Community & Consumer Affairs con-
ducted a study to assess the need for sunrise review in Florida. The staff found the number of
proposals for the regulation of previously unregulated occupations filed each year to be large
and the approach to their evaluation inconsistent and recommended that Chapter 11, Florida
Statutes, be amended to include a sunrise section requiring formal legislative review of such bills
based on statutorily established criteria. FLA. S. COMM. ON ECON., CoMM'Y & CONS. AFFAIRS, AN
EVALUATION OF THE NEED FOR SUNRISE REVIEW OF PROPOSED REGULATION OF UNREGULATED
PROFESSIONS IN FLORIDA 51-55 (Mar. 1987). Senate Bill 489, reflecting those recommendations,
died in the Senate Committee on Rules & Calendar. FLA. S. JOUR. 120 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1987).
Efforts to establish sunrise review in Florida have apparently failed due to the included require-
ment that bills proposing new professional regulation be filed at least 90 days prior to the first
day of legislative session to allow for the required sunrise review.
13. Ch. 77-457, 1977 Fla. Laws 1845; SUNSET HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 2.
14. Ch. 76-168, 1976 Fla. Laws 295.
15. 1980 SUNSET REVIEW, supra note 7.
16. FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1987).
SUNSET REVIEW
and repeals of the 36 professions, occupations, businesses, and indus-
tries originally scheduled for 1982 by the Regulatory Reform Act of
1976 were divided and staggered between the years 1982, 1983 and
1984 by the Sunset Act. A schedule of second reviews was also estab-
lished for previously reviewed statutes. 17
The Regulatory Sunset Act replaced the original ambitious six-
year cycle of repeals with a more practical ten-year cycle and required
that any newly created regulatory statute also be scheduled for review
and automatic repeal within at least ten years of enactment. 8 Most
importantly, the Sunset Act provided that the legislative intent of the
Act was to require that the regulation subject to review be found nec-
essary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare and that the po-
lice power of the state be exercised only to the extent necessary for
that purpose. 9 The Act again set forth the six criteria which the Legis-
lature is required to consider in determining whether to continue a
regulatory program. Those criteria are:
(a) Would the absence of regulation significantly harm or
endanger the public health, safety, or welfare?
(b) Is there a reasonable relationship between the exercise of the
police power of the state and the protection of the public health,
safety, or welfare?
(c) Is there a less restrictive method of regulation available which
would adequately protect the public?
(d) Does the regulation have the effect of directly or indirectly
increasing the costs of any goods or services involved and, if so, to
what degree?
(e) Is the increase in cost more harmful to the public than the
harm which could result from the absence of regulation?
(f) Are any facets of the regulatory process designed for the
purpose of benefitting, and do they have as their primary effect the
benefit of, the regulated entity?20
Stated differently, the primary question answered by sunset review
of a regulatory statute is, "Does the law subject to review protect the
public from serious potential harm to such an extent that if the statute
was repealed, the public's health, safety, or welfare would be threat-
ened?"
If the answer is positive, then the statute must be evaluated to deter-
mine whether it is crafted to address the potential for serious public
17. Id.
18. FLA. STAT. § 11.61(4) (1987).
19. Id. § 11.61(2)(1).
20. Id. § 11.61(6).
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harm in the least restrictive manner and at the least possible cost. If
the answer is negative, however, the chapter must be allowed to re-
pealed.
B. Senate and House Sunset Reviews
The two Houses of the Legislature have conducted sunset review
differently since 1979. In 1978 and 1979, the first two years in which
sunset reviews were conducted, the Legislative Committee Staff of the
Senate and House Governmental Operations Committees split the re-
view of statutes scheduled for review. This resulted in a single sunset
review of each statute. 21 After 1979, both Houses began conducting
simultaneous independent sunset reviews, resulting in two sunset re-
views of a single statute. The same year, seeking to make the best use
of the expertise of the existing Legislative Committee Staff, the Senate
President assigned sunset reviews to the substantive senate committee
charged with oversight of the particular law subject to repeal.22 The
reviews are now assigned as interim projects the year before the sched-
uled repeal. The senate committee to which a review has been assigned
has routinely prepared and published a formal sunset report prior to
the commencement of the legislative session. 23 In preparation of each
report, the senate committee sends a questionnaire to the involved
state regulatory agency and interested state associations, and conducts
workshops to identify developing issues. 24 The final sunset report gen-
erally includes findings of facts deduced from the responses to such
questionnaires and information obtained in the workshops, conclu-
sions based on those findings, less restrictive alternatives, if any, to
the present method of regulation, and recommendations based on the
offered alternatives.25 Such recommendations are typically elevated to
a Proposed Committee Bill (PCB) which plays host, after its public
presentation, to amendments proposed by interested parties and by
the involved state regulatory agency familiar with any inadequacies or
improprieties in the current statute. The contents of both the report
and the accompanying PCB remain confidential until presented to the
committee membership at a formal public committee meeting .26 The
confidentiality, intended to circumvent lobbying by interested parties,
allows staff recommendations to be perceived as "pure," uninflu-
21. SENATE REviEw OF SUNSET, supra note 9, at 2.
22. Id. at 47-48.
23. Id. at 56.
24. Id. at 46-47.
25. Id. at 51-54.
26. Id. at 49, 54, 65.
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enced by parties with a stake in the outcome of the review process. 27
In the House of Representatives, sunset reviews are typically as-
signed to the House Regulatory Reform Committee, created in 1979
by then Speaker Hyatt Brown. 21 It was believed that a new committee
could more objectively assess the effectiveness of the reviewed pro-
gram.29 The House of Representatives, although conducting sunset re-
views as mandated, has less frequently reduced committee findings to
published pre-session sunset reports and did not issue a pre-session
report related to either the 1980 or 1988 sunset review of motor vehi-
cle manufacturers . 30
Although the House Regulatory Reform Committee also issues
questionnaires and conducts workshops, in the past, when the staff
had concluded that a law should be allowed to repeal, it typically is-
sued neither a report nor a bill analysis.3 Because a statute scheduled
for sunset review will repeal automatically, a bill is only necessary to
reenact the statute, not to repeal it. The Regulatory Reform Commit-
tee, unlike the involved senate committees, encourages early participa-
tion by parties interested in the outcome in the sunset review process
and regularly discloses its unfolding deliberations.3 2 Because the Regu-
latory Reform Committee considers and accommodates special inter-
est proposals prior to converting staff recommendations to a PCB,
House sunset bills are more frequently perceived as reflecting political
influence than are Senate sunset bills. In that way, the sunset process
is compromised, or subject to abuse, to the extent that the House rec-
ommendation or PCB is not constrained by the responses to the six
criteria of section 11.61, Florida Statutes. 31
The sunset process is abused again when the sunset recommenda-
tion reflects the responses to the criteria, but the Legislature ignores
27. Id. at 64-65.
28. Id. at 56. Although all sunset reviews are assigned by the Speaker of the House, the
majority are assigned to the House of Representatives Committee on Regulatory Reform. The
Committee Chairman, at his discretion, assigns the reviews to one of three subcommittees. The
House of Representatives Committee on Regulatory Reform has subcommittees concerning busi-
ness regulation, professional regulation, and technical and consumer resources. All bills resulting
from sunset review are ultimately heard by the full Committee, regardless of subcommittee ac-
tion.
29. Id. at 46-47.
30. Id. at 47-48, 59-60. In 1988 the House of Representatives Regulatory Reform Commit-
tee issued a written post-session sunset review dated July 1, 1988, which could more properly be
characterized as a summary than as a recommendation.
31. Id. at 48.
32. Id. at 58.
33. Id. at 58, 64-65. For that reason, while the staff of the involved senate committee and
House of Representatives Regulatory Reform Committee may arrive at the same general conclu-
sions pursuant to sunset review, the PCB's of the Senate and House committees may not resem-
ble one another.
1988]
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that recommendation. The Legislature has contravened sunset recom-
mendations in this way several times. For instance, in the 1983-1984
interim, the staff of the Senate Economic, Community and Consumer
Affairs Committee conducted a sunset review of chapter 310, Florida
Statutes, relating to harbor pilots, piloting, and pilotage.14 The review
focused on section 310.061,' 3 which restricted to ninety-three the num-
ber of pilots to be licensed in thirteen listed Florida ports and directed
the Florida Board of Pilot Commissioners to determine the number of
pilots necessary for each port based on the Board's determination of
supply and demand for piloting services and the public's interest in
maintaining safe and efficient services. The staff found that the estab-
lished quota statutorily limiting the number of pilots that may be li-
censed in Florida operated to establish and maintain a monopoly.3 6
That monopoly, in turn, was found to stifle competition and result in
artificially high pilotage rates With no accompanying public benefit.17
The staff concluded that the state's regulation of pilots was more re-
strictive than necessary to protect the public from incompetent pilots.
Rather than use quotas or a board-determined level of supply and de-
mand, it was suggested that licensure requirements could be developed
not only to insure that only competent individuals are licensed as pi-
lots and deputy pilots, but that all qualified individuals would be eligi-
ble.3" As a result, the staff recommended that the language
establishing the restrictive quota and board determination be deleted
from the chapter and that two qualification standards be created pro-
viding a licensure exam for pilots and certification exam for deputy
pilots. This, it was reasoned, would broaden the pool from which can-
didates for pilot licenses and deputy pilot certificates could be chosen,
increase competition within the profession, and allow piloting rates to
be set by the marketplace to the benefit of the public, rather than by
the quota or the Board of Pilot Commissioners to the benefit of har-
bor pilots. The staff's recommendation was guided by the criteria of
section 11.61.39 The Legislature, however, not only left untouched the
anti-competitive quota and board determination, but elected not to
respond to the recommendation that exams be developed to both as-
34. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON ECON., COMM'Y & CONS. AFFAIRS, A REVIEW OF CHAPTER
310, FLORIDA STATUTES, RELATING TO PILOTS, PILOTING, AND PILOTAGE (Dec. 14, 1983) [hereinaf-
ter PILOT SUNSET REVIEW].
35. FLA. STAT. § 310.061 (1987).
36. PILOT SUNSET REVIEW, supra note 34, at 48.
37. Id. at 67-68.
38. Id. at 65.
39. FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1987).
SUNSET REVIEW
sess competency to insure the public against unqualified pilots and to
increase the pool of harbor pilots to the benefit of the public °
In 1985, the Legislature contravened a sunset recommendation. In
the 1984-1985 interim, the Senate Committee on Economic, Commu-
nity and Consumer Affairs conducted sunset reviews of chapter 476,
Florida Statutes, relating to barbering, and chapter 477, Florida
Statutes, relating to cosmetology. 4' Upon review, the staff found that
individuals who offer hair cutting and styling services no longer posed
a significant threat to those seeking such services in that original tools
such as straight razors and marcel irons had been subsequently re-
placed by safer tools. Noting that complaints against such practition-
ers based on misuse of tools or mechanical applicators were almost
nonexistent, 42 the staff determined that the principal remaining threat
to the public posed by either the practice of barbering or cosmetology
was the application to the hair of chemicals used to color, wave, or
relax the hair.43 Certain concentrated chemicals, it was found, may
produce primary irritations or allergic reactions and result in compli-
cations. As a result, the staff concluded that the reviewed statutes pro-
vided for the exercise of police power "far beyond that which is
necessary to protect the public's health, safety, and welfare,"44 as con-
templated by section 11.61(2)(a). Accordingly, the staff recommended
that chapters 476 and 477 be repealed and that a regulatory law lim-
ited to "[h]air [cihemical [a]pplicators" be enacted to protect the pub-
lic from the application of certain caustic chemicals to the hair for
aesthetic reasons by persons for compensation. 45 The Legislature, in
response to heavy lobbying by barbers and cosmetologists, not only
disregarded the recommendation to allow both chapters to repeal, but
significantly expanded the state regulation of both barbers and cosme-
tologists. Further, the Legislature elected not to address what had
been identified as the only significant threat of harm, chemical hair
applications. 46 In fact, as a result of the sunset process, several newly
40. Fla. CS for SB 150 (1984), the sunset bill relating to harbor pilots, passed 28 to 0 in the
Senate, FLA. S. JOUR. 463 (Reg. Sess. May 24, 1984), and 105 to 0 in the House, FLA. H.R.
JOUR. 769 (Reg. Sess. May 24, 1984). See FLA. STAT. § 310 (1987).
41. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON ECON. COMM'Y & CONS. AFFAIRS, A REVIEw OF CHAPTER
476, FLORIDA STATUTES, BARBERING AND CHAPTER 477, FLORIDA STATUTES, COSMETOLOGY (Jan.
1985).
42. Id. at 104.
43. Id. at 101-02.
44. Id. at 103.
45. Id. at 110-11.
46. Fla. CS for SB 218 (1985). The sunset bill relating to barbers and cosmetologists passed
35 to 1 in the Senate, FLA. S. JOUR. 1040 (Reg. Sess. May 31, 1985), and 94 to 12 in the House,
FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1090 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985); see FLA. STAT. § 477 (1987).
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regulated specialists were included within the practice of cosmetology,
including manicurists, pedicurists, and those who administer facials.
47
In 1988, the Legislature contravened still another sunset recommen-
dation and incorporated into the sunset bill a bill that had repeatedly
died in previous sessions. In the 1986 and 1987 legislative sessions,
similar bills creating the Interior Designers Licensing Act were filed in
both Houses. The bills provided for the regulation of interior design-
ers by the Department of Professional Regulation and established ed-
ucation, experience, and examination prerequisites to licensure, as
well as continuing education requirements for renewal and reactiva-
tion. The bills also suggested fees and provided grounds for discipli-
nary action. In 1986, Senate Bill 1226 died in committee and House
Bill 1127 died on the calendar.48 In 1987, both Senate Bill 1105 and
House Bill 741 died on the calendar.4 9 A bill analysis of the Senate Bill
commented "this is a title act and does not prevent anyone from prac-
ticing interior design, but only protects the use of the title 'interior
designer.' "So The focus of the bill on the protection of the use of the
title would not appear to coincide with the public intended to be pro-
tected by the Sunset Act. In 1988, a bill identical to those filed in 1986
and 1987, House Bill 94, was filed in the House.
In the 1987-1988 interim, the staff of the Senate Committee on Eco-
nomic, Community and Consumer Affairs conducted a sunset review
of chapter 481, Part I, Florida Statutes, relating to the practice of
architecture.51 As a result of that review, the staff found that while a
potential for harm to the public would exist if the statute were allowed
to repeal,52 certain provisions, such as the requirement that at least
one principal officer of a corporation or partner of a partnership be
an architect, to be overly restrictive with no corresponding benefit to
the public." The staff, therefore, recommended that the statute be
47. The rationale for placing the burden on the professional group seeking regulation is
based on the phenomenon that requests for regulation are typically initiated not by consumers
seeking protection from abuse, but by the practitioners themselves seeking the benefits of regula-
tion such as reduced competition due to restrictive entry standards and the resulting increase in
the status of the profession. B. SHIMBERG & D. ROEDERER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: QUES-
TIONS A LEGISLATOR SHOULD ASK THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 3 (Mar. 1978).
48. FLA. S. JouR. 501 (Reg. Sess. May 29, 1986); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 447 (Reg. Sess. May 19,
1986).
49. FLA. S. JouR. 626 (Reg. Sess. June 2, 1987); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 453 (Reg. Sess. May 15,
1987).
50. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Econ., Comm'y. & Cons. Affairs, CS for SB 1105 (1987)
Staff Analysis 4 (rev. May 7, 1987) (on file with committee).
51. STAFF OF THE FLA. S. COMM. ON ECON., COMM'Y & CONS. AFFAIRS, A REVIEW OF CHAP-
TER 481, PART 1, FLORIDA STATUTES, ARCHITECTURE (Nov. 1987).
52. Id. at 88.
53. Id.
SUNSET REVIEW
reenacted with minor amendments.14 No reference was made in the
sunset review to the practice of interior design. Accordingly, neither
the Senate nor the House bills resulting from the 1987-1988 sunset re-
views of the practice of architecture originally referred to the practice
of interior design." Both sunset bills, however, were amended as a
result of an effective interior designer lobby to include the substance
of the bills providing for the regulation of interior designers that had
been unsuccessfully filed in both houses in 1986 and 1987, and in the
House in 1988.56 Not only were education, experience, and examina-
tion requirements established and fees imposed, but because the bill
creating an interior designer licensing act was amended into the sunset
bill, the Board of Architecture was renamed the Board of Architecture
and Interior Design and an interior design advisory board was created
to advise the Department. The sunset bill, therefore, a "must-pass ' 5 7
bill, intended to reflect the scrutiny of existing regulatory statutes, was
loaded down with a payload that subjected a previously unregulated
occupation, interior designers, to regulation. The sunset bill, House
Bill 1502, passed 116 to 0 in the House 8 and 34 to 0 in the Senate. 9
The 1988 sunset review of the motor vehicle manufacturer licensing
statute, however, offers the most egregious example of this form of
abuseA0
While the focus of this Article is the Legislature's response to the
1980 and 1988 sunset recommendations to allow the motor vehicle
manufacturers licensing statute to repeal, a history of the motor vehi-
cle manufacturer-dealer relationship both eases understanding of the
Legislature's otherwise perplexing response to such recommendations
and points toward a resolution of the problem created by such re-
sponse. The Article, therefore, is prefaced with a brief history of the
motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer relationship in the United States
and the dealers' journey for relief through various forums until their
arrival in the state legislatures.
54. Id. at 91-95.
55. Fla. SB 127 (1988); Fla. HB 1502 (1988).
56. See Fla. HB 94 (1988).
57. The sunset process is perceived by some to encourage circumvention of the methodical,
deliberative nature of the legislative process in that it creates a "crisis" situation; a regulation
faces extinction absent legislative action. A provision that warrants further study, therefore, or is
altogether an inappropriate subject of regulation, may elude the safeguards of the legislative
process by its inclusion in a sunset bill. SENATE REVIEW OF SUNSET, supra note 9, at 2.
58. FLA. H.R. Joup. 1525 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1988).
59. FLA. S. Jout. 983 (Reg. Sess. June 3, 1988).
60. The Senate Review of Sunset focused on a cost-benefit analysis of the sunset process
and not instances of abuse of the process.
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C. A History of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturer-Dealer
Relationship
The goals and interests of motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers
have been counterposed since the inception of their relationship.
While both want to sell motor vehicles, manufacturers want to retain
residual control of their dealers and dealers want to wrest more inde-
pendence from their manufacturers. Dealers, bowed by manufacturer
dominance, have sought relief from the "onerous" terms of their
franchise agreements over the years in various forums: the courts, the
state legislatures, Congress, and finally again, and successfully, the
state legislatures. Conversely, manufacturers have emerged victorious
in all but the last forum; their dealer franchise agreements are pres-
ently subject to varying degrees of regulation in forty-six states. 61
The manufacturer's dominance of the dealer is rooted in the early
methods of motor vehicle distribution. Originally, manufacturers op-
erated local dealerships from their central offices, but with increased
production, this method of distribution was no longer cost-effective.
Soon, the franchise system evolved offering a preferred method of
61. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-20-1 (Supp. 1988); Arizona: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1301
(Supp. 1987); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-112-101 (1987); California: CAL. VEH. CODE §§
3060-69, 11700 (West 1986); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-101 (Supp. 1987); Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 42-133r (West 1958); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4901 (Supp.
1986); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 320.60 (1987); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1.620 (Supp. 1988);
Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 437-1 (1985); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 49-2401 (1987); Illinois: ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, par. 751 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Iowa: IOWA CODE Am. § 322A.1
(West 1988); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2401 (1982); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT ANN. §
190.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1251 (West 1988);
Maine: ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1161 (Supp. 1987); Maryland: MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 15-101 (1986); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93B, § 1 (West. 1988); Michigan: MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 445.1561 (West 1988); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80E.01 (West
1986); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-51 (Supp. 1988); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§
61-4-101, -201 (1987); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.36311 (Michie 1987); New Hamp-
shire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-C:1 (Supp. 1987); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-1
(1978); New York: N.Y. vEn. & TRAF. LAW § 461 (McKinney 1986); North Carolina: N.C. GEN
STAT. § 20-285 (Supp. 1987); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-07-01.1 (Supp. 1987);
Ohio: Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4517.50 (Anderson 1987); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 561 (West 1987); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 650.120 (1983); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 818.1 (Purdon 1988); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWs § 31-5.1-1 (Supp. 1988); South Caro-
lina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); South Dakota: S.D. CODiFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 32-6B-41 (Supp. 1988); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-17-101 (Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX.
REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 1.01 (Vernon 1988); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-14-1
(1986); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4083 (1984); Virginia: VA. CODE § 46.1-515 (Supp.
1988); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.70.005 (1986); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §
17A-6A-1 (1986); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.01 (West Supp. 1987); Wyoming: Wyo.
STAT. § 31-16-101 (Supp. 1988). Several states use franchise relations statutes of general applica-
tion to govern the motor vehicle industry. Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. 23-2-2.7 (Burns 1988); Mis-
souri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.400 (Vernon Supp. 1988); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-1-
12 (West 1988).
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distribution which decreased the costs and irritations associated with
an integrated system. 62 Dealers, originally agents of the manufacturer,
evolved into quasi-independent sellers. The franchise system, too,
however, soon revealed inherent problems, most of which were mani-
festations of the disparity in the bargaining power of the manufactur-
ers and the franchisees. 63 Manufacturers, whose success or failure
rested solely on the sales of their dealers, sought to retain supervisory
control over their retail operations in many ways, including through
the purposeful manipulation of the motor vehicle supply, the estab-
lishment of other dealers in the same area, and retention of the uncon-
ditional right to cancel a dealer's franchise agreement. 64
Manufacturers also generally prohibited their dealers from transfer-
ring or selling ownership of the franchise without the permission of
the manufacturer. Manufacturers forced their dealers to accept unor-
dered vehicles but were exempt from liability for failure to deliver ve-
hicles as promised. Despite these lopsided terms, applicants for
franchises were not scarce. Dealers responded to manufacturers' at-
tempts at control, especially as manifested in "wrongful" termination
of the franchise agreement, in several ways.
First, individual dealers whose franchise agreements had been can-
celled sought relief in the courts, arguing that the termination was a
breach of the terms of a binding contract, which would enable the
dealer to recover damages. The courts initially rejected the argument
by finding that both "lack of mutuality" and "indefiniteness" ren-
dered the franchise agreement void and unenforceable as a contract.
In S.B. McMaster, Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,65 however, the court
began a pattern of judicial noninterference, concluding that the manu-
facturers "are entirely within their rights in so framing their contract
as to carry out their intention. The intention of the parties in the ab-
sence of any ground of public policy must prevail, and their intention
must be gathered from the terms of the contract itself."6 The court,
though sympathizing with the plight of "the comparatively helpless
dealer at the mercy of the manufacturer," nonetheless held, "we can-
62. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES 2 (2d ed. 1978).
63. See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE
L.J. 1135, 1156 (1957); See also S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTo-
MOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966); S. REP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1956).
64. See generally J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE PouTcs OF DISTRmIUTION 107-58 (1955); FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY, H.R. Doc. No. 468, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1075 (1939).
65. 3 F.2d 469 (E.D.S.C. 1925).
66. Id. at 473.
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not make contracts for parties or protect them from the provisions of
contracts which they have made for themselves. Dealers doubtless ac-
cept these one sided contracts because they think that the right to deal
in the product of the manufacturer, even on his terms, is valuable to
them.' 67
Commentators criticized this early application of contract law by
the courts. 68 Later, in Buggs v. Ford Motor Co.,69 the court found
that the franchise agreement constituted a valid contract, but one sub-
ject to cancellation provisions that terminated all legal obligations
arising under it. Either way, the dealers were losing. When they re-
sponded by asking the courts to at least impose a condition of good
faith upon the manufacturer's power to terminate, the court in Bush-
wick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. ,70 siding with the man-
ufacturer, refused. The court reasoned that "the situation arises from
the strong bargaining position which economic factors give the great
automobile manufacturing companies: the dealers are not misled or
imposed upon, but accept as nonetheless advantageous an agreement
in form bilateral, in fact one-sided." ' 7'
While individual motor vehicle dealers were losing in the courts,
motor vehicle dealers' organizations were lobbying state legislatures to
enact remedial legislation regulating manufacturer conduct. The first
state regulation of motor vehicle manufacturers was drafted by the
Wisconsin Automotive Traders Association (WATA), was enacted by
the Wisconsin Legislature in 1935, and was amended in 193772 to re-
quire that all motor vehicle manufacturers be licensed to do business
in the state; to label as wrongful certain conduct, including unfair
cancellation of the dealer's franchise; and to impose a primary sanc-
tion of license revocation. 73 Other state dealer associations, with assis-
tance in both drafting and strategy from the WATA, successfully
pressed for similar legislation in their states, including Florida in
1941 .74 However, only a small number of states enacted laws regulat-
ing motor vehicle manufacturers. Dealer associations in some states
had not pushed for such state regulation of manufacturers because
67. Id.
68. Kessler, supra note 63, at 1156; Comment, The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act: A
'New Departure'in Federal Legislation?, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 253, 256 (1957).
69. 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 (1940).
70. 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
71. Id.
72. Act of July 1, 1937, ch. 377-78, 417, 1937 Wis. Laws. 602-03, 688. See S. MACAULAY,
supra note 63, at 31-32.
73. S. MACAULAY, supra note 63, at 31-43.
74. Ch. 20236, Laws of Fla. (1941) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 320.60-.70 (1987)).
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they either did not believe that governmental regulation was appropri-
ate or that manufacturer and dealer differences merited incurring
manufacturer hostility.7
Unsatisfied with their limited and varied success in the state legisla-
tures, dealers, through the National Automobile Dealers Association
(NADA), sought to blame existing unfair trade practices on manufac-
turer dominance. The dealers' association, advocating federal legisla-
tion to redress the power imbalance between dealers and
manufacturers and correct the resulting inequities, petitioned the Wis-
consin Legislature to introduce a NADA resolution directing the FTC
to investigate manufacturers' policies. 76 The resulting FTC investiga-
tion, however, surprisingly attacked the dealers for conduct which se-
riously restricted competition, such as price-fixing, which was
unrelated to manufacturer dominance. The FTC heaped praise upon
the manufacturer, finding:
Active competition among automobile manufacturers, although
some of them have made very large profits, gave to the public
improved products, often at substantially reduced prices .... Such
competition has been the basis for the remarkable growth of the
industry. Consumer benefits from competition in the automobile-
manufacturing industry have probably been more substantial than in
any other large industry studied by the Commission. 77
The FTC recommended only moderate limits on the vertical power
it found to be necessarily concomitant with the manufacturer's size.
The FTC's investigation and report, however, were not followed by
legislation. In addition, a proposed Motor Vehicle Act of 1940,
drafted in 1939 by the Executive Committee of NADA, was rejected
by a majority of the dealers. Commentators have partially based the
sudden dealer-nonsupport of both the FTC Report recommendations
and NADA's proposed federal bill on the dealer criticisms contained
in the FTC report and the fact that territorial security clauses had
been removed from NADA's bill.7 1
In the early 1950s, a post-war buyers' market increased dealer com-
petition. Motor vehicle manufacturers maintained control over deal-
75. S. MACAULAY, supra note 63, at 34.
76. Id. at 38.
77. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE MOTOR VEH-ICLE INDUSTRY, H.R. Doc. No.
468, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1074 (1939).
78. C. HEwIr, AUTOMOBILE FRAcmsE AGREEMENTS 110 (1956); J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra
note 64, at 140 (dealers also feared federal regulation of manufacturers would lead to similar
regulation of dealers).
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ers' quotas with increased threats of termination. These threats
renewed dealer interest in protective federal legislation and generated
several Congressional hearings. 79 The dealers prevailed and the hear-
ings collectively resulted in the Federal Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act of 1956 (DDCA).80
The DDCA provides a civil cause of action for a dealer damaged by
the manufacturer's failure "to act in good faith in . . . terminating,
canceling, or not renewing the franchise with said dealer."'" The pri-
mary purpose of the Act was "to correct the abuses of arbitrary ter-
mination and nonrenewal '8 2 and to impose a condition of good faith
where the courts, in decisions such as Bushwick,83 would not. The Act
in its final form defined "good faith" as:
[the] duty of each party to any franchise . . . to act in a fair and
equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party
freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or
intimidation from the other party: Provided, that recommendation,
endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or argument shall not
be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.14
This definition rendered the DDCA useless as a dealer remedy. Ten
years after the federal law was enacted, one study concluded that "the
dealers have been highly unsuccessful in recovering money from the
manufacturers as a result of filing complaints under this act." 5 Their
lack of success was attributed to the courts' narrow application of the
DDCA to instances in which the dealer could show not general unfair-
ness or arbitrariness, but coercion or intimidation.8 6
79. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 960-61 (1956); Dealer Franchises: Hearings Before the Antitrust
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1956); Mkt. Legis-
lation: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Comm.,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 400 (1956); General Motors: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3603 (1955). For a
comprehensive narration of these hearings see also Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relation-
ship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers
and Their Dealers, 1965 Wis. L. Rav. 483.
80. Ch. 1038, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982)).
81. S. RaP. No. 2073, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
82. Id. at 6.
83. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1982) (emphasis in the original).
85. S. MACAULAY, supra note 63, at 93.
86. See, e.g., Ed Houser Enter. v. General Motors Corp., 595 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1979);
Kotula v. Ford Motor Corp., 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965);
Kessler, supra note 63, at 1179.
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The narrow application of the DDCA continues today and was
commented upon by the court in Quarles v. General Motors Corp.87
As "Congress' initial effort at regulation of the relationships
between automobile manufacturers and their dealers", the DDCA
admittedly falls far short of providing a basis for relief in every case
of unfair conduct, including many cases which "might well call for
remedial action."
To demonstrate an absence of "good faith" within the meaning of
the DDCA, therefore, it will not suffice to show that a dealership's
termination was arbitrary, or even unfair. It must be shown that
defendant coerced or intimidated plaintiff, and that the coercion was
designed to achieve some objective which was improper or wrongful
Where there is no evidence of such wrongful coercion or intimidation
by defendant, as those terms have been narrowly construed, there
can be no recovery under the DDCA, "even if the manufacturer
otherwise acted in 'bad faith' as that term is normally used.""8
To appreciate subsequent state legislation, it is useful to scrutinize
the definition of good faith as originally drafted. The early language
required the manufacturer to act in a "fair, equitable, and nonarbi-
trary manner so as to guarantee the dealer freedom from coercion...
or intimidation, and in order to preserve and protect all the equities of
the automobile dealer which are inherent in the nature of the relation-
ship between the automobile dealer and automobile manufacturer. 89
This definition provided more than freedom from coercion. It pro-
vided dealers protection from unfair, inequitable, and arbitrary manu-
facturer conduct. Manufacturers argued, however, that such language
would sharply swing the balance of power toward the dealer, since
even an unmotivated dealer with poor sales may be found to have
"equities." The definition would also build for dealers "a sanctuary
from the rigors of competition" at the cost of denying consumers the
benefits of competition.9 The equities language was removed to pre-
vent a construction of "good faith" inconsistent with antitrust princi-
ples. Therefore, although the DDCA worked to more evenly balance
the contractual scales between the manufacturer and the dealer with
87. 597 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
88. Id. at 1040-41 (citations omitted).
89. S. REP. No. 3879, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956), reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1333 (emphasis added).
90. S. MACAULAY, supra note 63, at 61-63.
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more dealer protection, it left the dealers unsatisfied and refocused on
the state legislatures.
Section 1225 of the DDCA reads, "[Tihis chapter shall not invali-
date any provision of the laws of any State except insofar as there is a
direct conflict between an express provision of this chapter and an
express provision of State law which can not be reconciled." 9' This
section has been construed as an invitation for supplemental state reg-
ulation of the manufacturer-dealer relationship92 and to date, forty-six
states, 93 including Florida, have responded by enacting legislation
which regulates the relationship between motor vehicle manufacturers
and dealers.
D. Florida's Motor Vehicle Manufacturer Licensing Statute
In Florida, regulation of motor vehicle manufacturers, factory
branches and representatives, distributors, and importers began in
1941 with the passage of chapter 20236, Laws of Florida.94 The stat-
ute, unlike the Federal Dealer Day in Court Act of 1956, did not at-
tempt to regulate the manufacturer-dealer franchise relationship.
Instead, it simply required manufacturers and factory branches and
representatives to obtain a license in order to engage in business in
Florida. 95 This requirement did not prove to be a significant entry bar-
rier. 96 The State Motor Vehicle Commissioner was authorized to
grant, deny, suspend, or revoke licenses after a public hearing. Per-
sons convicted of violating the provisions of the act were guilty of a
misdemeanor and subject to fine, imprisonment, or both. 97 The Com-
missioner was authorized to inspect the relevant files of a licensee if a
written complaint was made against such licensee. 98
Early amendments to the statute were infrequent and of relatively
minor consequence. In 1951, chapter 26869 provided that proceeds
from license application and renewal fees were to be credited to the
general revenue fund rather than to the counties.99 In 1959, the statute
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (1982).
92. Tober Foreign Motors v. Reiter Oldsmobile, 381 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Mass. 1975).
93. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
94. Ch. 20236, Laws of Fla. 103 (1941) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 320.60-.70 (1987)).
95. Id. at 104.
96. Eckard, The Effects of State Automobile Dealer Entry Regulation on New Car Prices,
24 EcON. INQ iRY 223, 224 n.4 (1985). The initial license fee was only $5. Ch. 20236, § 3, Laws
of Fla. 103, 104 (1941).
97. Ch. 20236, § 3, Laws of Fla. 103, 104-05 (1941) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 320.62
(1987)).
98. Id. at 106.
99. Ch. 26869, § 2, Laws of Fla. 766, 768-69 (1951) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 16.48 and
repealed by ch. 67-472, § 10, 1967 Fla. Laws 1481, 1491 (1967)).
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was amended to authorize disciplinary action to an applicant or li-
censee who sold, exchanged, or rented a motorcycle with more than
five brake horsepower and with the knowledge that it was intended
for use by a holder of a restricted driver's license.1°° In 1965, the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles was created under the control of the Gov-
ernor and the Cabinet and the Director of the Department was given
all the powers and duties formerly vested in the Motor Vehicle Com-
missioner.101 Under the Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969,
the Department of Motor Vehicles was transferred to the Department
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV).102
It was not until 1970 that the statute, in addition to perfunctory and
conforming amendments, 103 was amended to regulate a manufactur-
er's franchise relationship with its dealers. Section 320.641, Florida
Statutes, was created to prohibit "unfair" cancellation by the manu-
facturer of a dealer franchise agreement.°" Section 320.641 required a
manufacturer to give ninety days notice of its intent to cancel the
dealer's franchise agreement, entitling a dealer who files a complaint
with the DHSMV within that time to a hearing for a determination of
unfair discontinuation. Franchise agreements continued in effect until
the Department rendered a final determination and prevailing dealers
were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. 05 The "equities" and "un-
fair" language included in this section resembles the language Con-
gress rejected in the final draft of the DDCA to prevent any
construction inconsistent with antitrust principles.
Section 320.642, was created to require the Department to deny an
application for a dealer license in any community or territory where
the manufacturer's presently licensed franchise dealer or dealers were
complying with the terms of the franchise agreement and were provid-
ing adequate representation for the manufacturer.' °0 The burden of
showing inadequate representation was expressly placed on the manu-
100. Ch. 59-351, § 4, 1959 Fla. Laws 1242, 1243-44 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.64 (1987)).
101. Ch. 65-190, § 1, 1965 Fla. Laws 447, 447-48 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 20.24
(1987)).
102. Ch. 69-106, § 24, 1969 Fla. Laws 490, 543 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 20.24
(1987)).
103. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.60-70 (1977). Such amendments resulted in an increase of the licens-
ing fee from $5 to $10, a provision for hearing procedures and procedures for reinstatement, and
a seven member advisory council consisting of representatives of the industry and the public, and
the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles to advise and assist the Department in administer-
ing the law. The Department was also authorized to seek injunctive relief in circuit court to
restrain persons from engaging in the motor vehicle manufacturing business in the state without
a license. FLA. STAT. § 320.695 (1977).
104. FLA. STAT. § 320.641 (1987).
105. Id. § 320.641(5).
106. Id. § 320.642.
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facturer 0 7 Remarkably, as a result of these two provisions, not only
could the state restrict a manufacturer's ability to end its business re-
lationship with an existing dealer, it could also restrict a manufactur-
er's establishment of new dealerships.
In 1976, Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-1.008 was promul-
gated providing that the Director of the DHSMV must notify all pres-
ently franchised dealers of the same line-make in the "territory or
community" of a manufacturer's proposed dealership and of their
right to a protest hearing. "Territory or community" was construed
by the DHSMV to mean (1) a county in which the proposed point was
to be located; (2) an adjoining or adjacent county; and (3) surround-
ing counties when a new point was proposed in a county in which
there were no existing dealers of like franchise. 10
Department policy provided that if no protests were received within
thirty days of notice, the application process continued. °9 If a dealer
protested within thirty days or filed an advance protest pursuant to
the rule, the Department was authorized to conduct a hearing wherein
the manufacturer was required to prove either that the existing dealer
was not complying with the terms of the franchise agreement or had
inadequately represented the manufacturer. 0
The restrictions contained in sections 320.641 and 320.642 were the
seeds of the motor vehicle manufacturer licensing statute that were to
become commonly referred to as the franchise provisions. Those pro-
visions allow the state to address issues which are already included as
negotiated terms in the private contract or franchise agreement and
which form the legal basis of the manufacturer-dealer relationship.
Another such provision, also enacted in 1970, required manufacturers
to reasonably compensate dealers for repairs performed pursuant to
its warranty, and for the cost of delivery and new motor vehicle prep-
aration services."' Further, the Director of the Division of Motor Ve-
hicles was empowered to impose civil fines for violations," 2 and
dealers suffering pecuniary loss were entitled to treble damages. "3
107. Id. The restriction originally surfaced in the Florida Statutes as a ground for discipli-
nary action in 1970, ch. 70-424, § 9, 1970 Fla. Laws 1269, 1279, and was isolated and elevated to
a single paragraph section that same year which directed the legislative statutory revision service
to conform all language to that of the Reorganization Act of 1969. Ch. 70-439, § 1, 1970 Fla.
Laws 1321, 1321.
108. Letter from Donna Thursby, Chief, Bureau of Licenses and Enforcement, Div. of Mo-
tor Veh., Dep't of High. Safety & Motor Veh., to Barbara Balzer, staff of Fla. S. Comm. on
Econ., Comm'y & Cons. Affairs (Feb. 8, 1988) (on file with committee).
109. Id.
110. 1988 SuNsET REvtaw, supra note 8, at 128.
111. FLA. STAT. § 320.692 (1987).
112. Id. § 320.698.
113. Id. § 320.697.
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In 1977, the Act was amended to authorize the Director of the
DHSMV to conduct hearings in accordance with the provisions of
chapter 120,114 and to provide that the Director's rulings would consti-
tute final agency action.' This allowed dealers to obtain an adminis-
trative hearing on the issues of unfair cancellation pursuant to section
320.641, or inadequate representation pursuant to section 320.642.
Typically, the DHSMV would relinquish jurisdiction of the issue to
the Department of Administrative Hearings, which would conduct a
hearing and make a recommended final order usually adopted by the
DHSMV. This was the state of the statute regulating motor vehicle
manufacturers when the statute was subject to sunset review in 1980.
E. The 1980 Sunset Review
In 1980, sunset review of sections 320.60-.70, Florida Statutes, was
conducted pursuant to chapter 76-168, Laws of Florida, and was as-
signed to the Senate Transportation Committee and to the House Reg-
ulatory Reform Committee. In 1988, sunset review of the statute was
conducted pursuant to chapter 81-318, Laws of Florida, and was ulti-
mately assigned in the Senate to the Economic, Community and Con-
sumer Affairs Committee and again in the House to the Regulatory
Reform Committee. The Senate Transportation Committee in 1980,
and the Senate Economic, Community and Consumer Affairs Com-
mittee in 1988, prepared and published a formal sunset review analysis
of the statute.11 6 The House Regulatory Reform Committee conducted
less formal reviews in 1980 and 1988 and never made a pre-session
recommendation." 7 The findings, conclusions, and recommendations
in the Senate Transportation Committee and the Senate Economic,
Community and Consumer Affairs Committee reports, therefore, will
be construed as representative of those made to the Legislature in
1980 and 1988, respectively. "8
In preparation of the 1980 Sunset Review, the Senate Transporta-
tion Committee Staff sent questionnaires regarding the manufacturer
licensing statute to four motor vehicle manufacturers and to the Flor-
ida Automobile Dealers Association." 9 Failing to receive any re-
114. Id. § 320.665.
115. Id.
116. 1980 SUNSET REvEw, supra note 7; 1988 SUNSET REvIEw, supra note 8.
117. The House Regulatory Reform Committee published a three volume report indicating
the results of the sunset reviews conducted by the Committee during the 1988 legislative session
on July 1, 1988, after the 1988 Legislature had adjourned. According to the staff, no pre-session
recommendation relating to motor vehicle manufacturers was ever made.
118. 1980 SUNSET REviEw, supra note 7.
119. Id. at 5.
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sponse, the staff reviewed several manufacturers' Sales and Service
Agreements (franchise agreements) and interviewed one former and
three current dealers.120 From the review of the manufacturers' fran-
chise agreements, the staff was provided insight into the manufactur-
ers' perception of the role of their franchised dealers. Such franchise
agreements expressly stated that the sale of motor vehicles is a very
competitive and high risk venture and that a cooperative effort on the
part of the manufacturer and the dealer is necessary for the venture to
succeed.' 21 Such agreements typically provided that dealers are respon-
sible for maintaining an aggressive sales program and providing ac-
ceptable service to the customer.' 22 For instance, one manufacturer's
contract provided that "[blecause the Company relies heavily on its
dealers for success, it reserves the right to cease doing business with
any dealer who is not contributing to such programs."1 23
From the interviews with dealers, the staff also gained insight into
the rationale behind the enactment of the motor vehicle manufacturer
licensing statute, or more specifically, the franchise provisions. The
dealers indicated that the franchise provisions were necessary to af-
ford dealers leverage against manufacturers which had historically
treated dealers unfairly. 24 The dealers especially argued the need for
prohibitions against a manufacturer's "unfair" cancellation of a
dealer's franchise agreement and against a manufacturer's establish-
ment of an additional franchised dealer in an area currently repre-
sented. 25 Those interviewed indicated that dealers had been reluctant
to object to undue manufacturer pressure for fear of losing their fran-
chise. A franchise, it was stressed, represented a large financial invest-
ment in terms of property, buildings, motor vehicles and parts
inventory, and personnel training expenses. 12 6 The dealers indicated
that "the public also derives benefits from some of those provisions
identified as directly benefitting dealers."l27 For instance, if manufac-
turers were able to discontinue a franchise at will, establish an addi-
tional dealership where an existing franchise holder was providing
adequate representation, or force dealers to accept inventory in excess
of that which the dealer ordered, the public, as well as incumbent
dealers, would be adversely affected in that an unrestrained manufac-
120. Id. at 33.
121. Id. at 33-34.
122. Id. at 34.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 33.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id. at 33.
127. Id. at 36.
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turer would overload the market area. 128 As a result, dealers would
fail to attract customers in sufficient quantity so as to enjoy a reason-
ably profitable venture and would be forced to reduce expenses. When
a dealer is forced to reduce expenses, the service department is typi-
cally immediately scaled down due to its costly service personnel and
parts inventory. Consequently, the customer would be adversely af-
fected by the reduced quality of services. 2 9
The staff, however, rejected the dealers' argument that the public
benefits, even secondarily, from the additional dealer restrictions for
two reasons. First, it found the argument to be "contrary to the gen-
erally accepted view that the public benefits from a competitive mar-
ket place."' 130 The staff reasoned that a customer would benefit from
several dealers rather than a single dealer in a market area to the ex-
tent that resulting competition would reduce the price of a new motor
vehicle.' 3 ' The staff concluded:
[jiust as with other commercial ventures, the better managed
dealerships should prosper, while less efficient operations could lose
business and eventually fail. In such an event, the public would
gravitate to the better operated dealerships where they would be able
to receive quality sales and service at an economical cost., 32
The staff found that its conclusion that the entry restriction primarily
benefited new motor vehicle dealers and not the public was buttressed
by the findings in two cases wherein section 320.642 had been specifi-
cally litigated. Second, the staff was unconvinced by the dealer argu-
ment that, unrestricted by the additional dealer provision,
manufacturers would be inclined to overload market areas to the det-
riment of both the dealers and fhe public. The staff indicated that a
manufacturer, prior to supporting a dealer license application for an
area already served by one of its franchised dealers, typically conducts
a sophisticated market analysis upon which such decision is based.,
The staff found nothing that would induce a manufacturer to pro-
mote several struggling and inefficient dealers in a single market area.
Instead, it found that the Department had approved twenty-two of the
twenty-four additional dealer applications filed in the previous five
years. 134 In other words, the manufacturer had almost always demon-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 36-37.
131. Id. at 37.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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strated that its existing franchised dealer was inadequately represent-
ing the manufacturer in the market area and that an additional
franchise could be established as proposed without overloading that
area. 135
A reading of the franchise provisions convinced the staff that a ma-
jority of the provisions are "primarily concerned with supporting the
dealer in his relationship with the manufacturer." 13 6 The staff specifi-
cally found that:
The sections relating to notice prior to the discontinuation or
cancellation of a franchise; proof of need by manufacturers for
additional franchises; compensation to dealers for warranty work;
authorization for dealers to seek injunctions; authorization to
recover treble damages in case of pecuniary loss; and the prohibition
against forcing the acceptance of unordered inventory offer direct
safeguards to the dealer that allow him protection against actions of
a manufacturer that he feels are detrimental.1 3 7
The staff concluded that two grounds for disciplinary action of a
manufacturer's license benefit the public: 1) the prohibition against
manufacturer coercion of a dealer to provide installment financing
through a specific lending institution, and 2) the prohibition against a
manufacturer's refusal to deliver to the dealer vehicles and parts
within a reasonable time and in an adequate quantity where the manu-
facturer has publicly advertised the availability of such vehicles and
parts. 3 " In the first instance, the public was found to have benefited
to the extent a new motor vehicle purchaser is not forced to finance
the new motor vehicle at an unreasonably high rate. In the second
instance, the public was found to have benefited to the extent the pro-
vision results in a reasonable assurance that the vehicle or part sought
is available as represented. 13 9
The staff concluded that if the motor vehicle manufacturer licensing
statute were allowed to repeal, significant harm would not befall the
public. 14 It further concluded that if the provisions found to benefit
the public were also allowed to repeal, complaints resulting from mo-
tor vehicle manufacturer misconduct or deceptive advertising could be
adequately resolved in the courts.' 4' The staff, therefore, recom-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 38.
137. Id. at 34-35.
138. Id. at 35-36.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 43.
141. Id. at 7.
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mended that the Legislature take no action to reenact the motor vehi-
cle manufacturer licensing statute. Notwithstanding the sunset review
recommendation to allow the statute to repeal, the Legislature not
only reenacted the provisions, but expanded the state's regulation of
the motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer relationship. Chapter 80-217,
Laws of Florida, amended section 320.641, Florida Statutes, which
prohibited a manufacturer's unfair cancellation of a dealer's franchise
agreement, to provide that a dealer who fails to engage in business for
ten consecutive business days is deemed to have abandoned his fran-
chise agreement. 42 The chapter also created section 320.643, to re-
quire that a dealer notify the manufacturer before a transfer,
assignment, or sale of a franchise agreement.' 43 The statute provided
that if the manufacturer failed to respond to the notice of the dealer's
intended transfer within sixty days of receipt of notice, approval was
to be deemed granted, and that a manufacturer's acceptance of the
proposed transferee could not be unreasonably withheld. A transfer
was not valid, however, unless the proposed transferee agreed in writ-
ing to comply with the terms of the franchise agreement then in effect.
II. THE 1980-1988 INTERIM
In the interim between the 1980 and 1988 sunset reviews, the Flor-
ida franchise provisions were frequently and significantly amended
until, by 1988, the Florida statute regulating the motor vehicle manu-
facturer-dealer franchise relationship was among the most restrictive
of the state statutes regulating motor vehicle manufacturers. During
the same interim, economists conducted two empirical studies which
addressed the impact of both state franchise regulations generally and
additional dealer restrictions specifically. Two other states similarly
conducted sunset reviews and two states, including Florida, conducted
performance audits of motor vehicle manufacturer licensing regula-
tions. Furthermore, the anti-competitive impact of state additional
dealer restrictions and other franchise provisions was studied and
commented upon repeatedly by the FTC. As a result, while the statute
recommended for repeal was being amended in the interim to further
address and restrict the motor vehicle manufacturer's relationship
with its franchised dealers, authors of empirical studies, sunset re-
views, performance audits, and FTC reports were consistently finding
such restrictions to be anti-competitive and their resulting effect on
new motor vehicle purchasers to be significantly adverse.
142. Ch. 80-217, §§ 6, 16, 17, 1980 Fla. Laws 684, 691, 700-01 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 320.641 (1987)).
143. Id. § 7, 1980 Fla. Laws at 691 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 320.643 (1987)).
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A. Interim Amendments
There were five primary amendments enacted during the 1980-1988
interim period. These provisions sought to accomplish the following:
1) to require a manufacturer to notify a dealer of its intent to replace
a succeeding franchisee, 2) to require a dealer's agreement to continue
in effect notwithstanding a change in a plan or system of distribution,
3) to create a presumption of unreasonableness where a manufacturer
refuses to accept a proposed transferee of good moral character, 4) to
prohibit a manufacturer from preventing a dealer from changing cer-
tain executive management control, and 5) to generally prohibit a
manufacturer from owning and operating a dealership in Florida for
the sale or service of motor vehicles already offered for sale under a
franchise agreement with a dealer in Florida.' 44
Most of these amendments were passed in 1984. The Legislature
also required that the manufacturers, as well as their factory branch
distributor, or importer, must be licensed before the manufacturers'
motor vehicles could be sold or leased in the state. As a result of this
mandatory licensing requirement, foreign manufacturers which had a
contractual relationship with, for example, a distributor, but not with
a Florida dealer of its product, or minimum contacts with the state,
would now be subject to the general jurisdiction of Florida courts.
With the addition of this provision and section 320.6405, Florida
Statutes, which created an expeditious fiction of agency between a
manufacturer and a dealer, dealers could more easily by-pass interme-
diaries, such as importers or distributors with which they had contrac-
tual privity, to reach a manufacturer with which they did not, to
address franchise termination issues.
Other 1984 amendments required a licensee to notify the Depart-
ment at least sixty days prior to offering a dealer a modification of a
franchise agreement to allow the Department the opportunity to verify
that such modification is not contrary to the provisions of the stat-
144. 1988 SuNsEr REVIEW, supra note 8, at 184. The staff found the following grounds for
disciplinary action to directly benefit the public and, therefore, did not recommend their repeal:
(1) section 320.64(5), prohibiting a licensee from forcing unordered commodities upon a dealer;
(2) section 320.64(10), prohibiting a licensee from entering into a franchise agreement with a
dealer who does not have sufficient facilities to provide service as warranted; (3) section
320.64(11), prohibiting a licensee from coercing a dealer to provide installment financing with a
specified institution; (4) section 320.64(12), prohibiting a licensee from using false, deceptive, or
misleading advertising regarding the sale of motor vehicles; and (5) section 320.64(13), prohibit-
ing a licensee from refusing to deliver in reasonable quantities within a reasonable time to his
dealers any vehicles or parts publicly advertised by the licensee to be immediately available. The
staff further recommended reenactment of section 320.645, restricting manufacturer ownership
of a franchise, and section 320.697, creating a civil action for up to treble damages; and section
320.698, providing for civil penalties.
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ute. 145 The amendments also imposed agency status on any entity dis-
tributing a manufacturer's product pursuant to a franchise agreement
and principal status on a manufacturer whose products are offered for
sale in Florida under a franchise agreement executed by an agent of
the manufacturer. '46
Grounds for manufacturer disciplinary action were added in both
1983 and 1984. In 1983, the failure of a licensee to indemnify its fran-
chised dealer who was not actively negligent for any judgment of
damages against a settlement agreed to by the licensee became a
ground for disciplinary action against a manufacturer. 47 In 1984, a
threat by a manufacturer to change a dealer's franchise agreement to
adversely affect the contractual rights of the dealer also became a
ground. 14 Other 1984 amendments required that dealer franchise
agreements provide that a manufacturer give a dealer written notice of
its intent to modify or replace a franchise with a succeeding franchise
which would adversely alter the dealer's rights under an existing agree-
ment or significantly impair his investment;' 49 that a dealer franchise
agreement continue in effect notwithstanding a change in a plan or
system of distribution and that the appointment of a new importer or
distributor be deemed such a change;'50 and that the Department,
upon the occurrence of such change, refuse approval of an application
for a license unless the applicant offers a dealer a new franchise agree-
ment containing substantially the same provisions contained in the
previous agreement or verifies with the Department its intent to fulfill
the obligations of its predecessor under the previous agreement. ' 5'
The balance of the 1984 amendments generally prohibited a manu-
facturer from interfering with a dealer's transfer or sale of the fran-
chise unless the manufacturer could prove that the buyer was of bad
moral character.5 2 Finally, minor changes were made in 1985 and
1987, increasing the license fee' 53 and removing a reference to "motor
scooters." 114
B. Interim Economic Studies
In 1982, the results of the first of two empirical economic impact
studies of growing state motor vehicle franchise regulations were pub-
145. Ch. 84-69, § 3, 1984 Fla. Laws 170, 171-72 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.63 (1987)).
146. Id. §§ 3, 4, 1984 Fla. Laws at 171, 172 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 320.63 (1987)).
147. Ch. 83-105, § 1, 1983 Fla. Laws 351, 351 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.64 (1987)).
148. Ch. 84-69, § 5, 1984 Fla. Laws 170, 172 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.64 (1987)).
149. Id. § 6, 1984 Fla. Laws at 174 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.641 (1987)).
150. Id. § 7, 1984 Fla. Laws at 175 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 320.6415 (1987)).
151. Id. § 8, 1984 Fla. Laws at 176 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 320.643 (1987)).
152. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.643 (1987)).
153. Ch. 85-176, § 5, 1985 Fla. Laws 1229, 1235 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.62 (1987)).
154. Ch. 87-161, § 15, 1987 Fla. Laws 1152, 1159 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.64 (1987)).
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lished in Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Re-
strictions on Automobile Distribution.'55 This article was later relied
upon by the FTC and others, including the Florida Auditor General's
Office, in their inquiries into the public benefit of state regulation of
the franchise relationship. The hypothesis tested in the studies were
that motor vehicle franchise regulations have tended to create local
market power for franchised dealers who have raised motor vehicle
prices and reduced motor vehicle sales. The extent of such increases
and reductions, it was hypothesized, depended upon the stringency of
the regulations favoring dealers. The effect of the regulations was
thought to entrench existing dealerships by hindering the creation of
new dealerships and the termination of inefficient existing dealer-
ships. 5 6 The four general regulatory policies selected were the require-
ment that dealers be licensed, the prohibition against manufacturers
establishing new dealerships in the same territory as an existing dealer
without cause, the prohibition against a manufacturer forcing dealers
to accept unordered motor vehicles, and the prohibition against man-
ufacturers cancelling a dealers' franchise without cause. 1 7 The author
tested the economic impact of these regulations using preregulation
data from 1954 and postregulation data from 1972 to demonstrate
that such state regulation protects existing dealers from the entry of
new dealerships, from manufacturer discipline, and from involuntary
termination at the expense of the new motor vehicle buying public. 58
The author found that the net effect of the restriction was fewer
dealerships'59 and increased market power resulting in higher new mo-
tor vehicle prices. More specifically, the author concluded that such
regulation increased the average new motor vehicle price by $390.160
Because only six states, Colorado in 1963, Iowa and Florida in 1970,
and Nebraska, Ohio and South Dakota in 1971, had enacted addi-
tional dealer restrictions prior to 1972, and at the time the study was
conducted, only one had had such regulation in effect for more than
two years, the amount of the new motor vehicle price increase specifi-
cally attributable to state entry restrictions appeared to be small. In
1983, the results of the second empirical study, The Effects of State
Automobile Dealer Entry Regulation on New Car Prices, were pub-
155. Smith, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automo-
bile Distribution, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 125 (1982).
156. Id. at 140.
157. Id. at 140-41.
158. Id. at 143.
159. Smith concluded that the impact of regulation in all states from 1954 to 1972 was a
15.30o reduction in the number of new motor vehicle dealerships. Id. at 146.
160. Id. at 154.
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lished.' 61 This article hypothesized that state additional dealer restric-
tions specifically result in increased new motor vehicle prices. 162 The
data used in the study consisted of the motor vehicle sales reports sub-
mitted to General Motors monthly by 5,717 Chevrolet dealers in busi-
ness during in 1978. By 1978, twenty-two states had enacted entry
restrictions. 63 States were divided into those enacting additional
dealer restrictions before 1975, those enacting entry restrictions in or
after 1975, and those which had not enacted entry restrictions.' 64
The study conjectured both that some time must pass after enact-
ment of an entry restriction before the effect of such law would be
measurable and that such effect would be greater in faster growing
urban areas than in slower growing rural areas. 165 Such conjecture was
supported by the results of the study. While it was found that entry
restrictions enacted in 1975 or after had an "insignificant" impact on
the price of a new motor vehicle sold in 1978, it was also found that
those entry restrictions enacted prior to 1975 worked to increase the
price of a new motor vehicle by $56.166 Additionally, the results indi-
cated that entry restrictions increase the price of new motor vehicles
by an average of $56 in urban areas and by $28 in rural areas in 1978
dollars. 167 From this it was extrapolated that the total cost of state
entry restrictions to new motor vehicle purchasers of all makes in 1978
was approximately $109 million. 168 The author noted that this amount
will undoubtedly increase to the extent that states without entry res-
trictions elect to enact such laws and to the extent the effect of exist-
ing entry restrictions increases. 69
C. Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act prohibits unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 170 The FTC is
responsible for enforcing the federal antitrust laws and for promoting
competition and protecting consumers from restraints of trade. 171 Ac-
cordingly, the Commission staff, upon request, provides comments to
161. Eckard, supra note 96.
162. Id. at 226.
163. Id. at 225-26.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 233.
166. Id. at 235-37.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 240.
169. Id.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
171. Id.
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federal, state, and local governmental bodies to assist their assessment
of the competitive and consumer welfare implications of pending pol-
icy issues. For instance, in 1982 and 1983, the FTC staff commented
on Delaware Senate Bill 513 and Senate Bill 26, respectively, similar
bills filed in successive sessions which would have amended Dela-
ware's "Motor Vehicle Franchising Act" to regulate the contractual
relationship between motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers. The
FTC stated that the provision in both bills which sought to regulate
the establishment or relocation of dealers would likely insulate exist-
ing dealers from competition, reduce new motor vehicle sales and
service in Delaware, and result in increased new motor vehicle prices
and reduced sales. 72 Similarly, in April 1987, the FTC staff com-
mented on Ohio Senate Bill 103 which would impose additional res-
trictions on the establishment, relocation, and termination of motor
vehicle dealers by manufacturers.'7 3 The FTC staff not only argued
against passage of the bill, which it stated would increase the already
costly and unnecessary restraints on competition, but also suggested
that repeal of Ohio's entire statute regulating motor vehicle franchises
would benefit consumers to the extent it would reduce new motor ve-
hicle prices. In June, 1987, the FTC staff endorsed the enactment of
Wisconsin Senate Bill 47 which sought to delete the state's entry re-
striction which inhibited competition and thereby raised the cost of
new motor vehicles for consumers.' 74 In addition, the staff gratui-
tously recommended the elimination of the existing requirement that
provided dealers the right to sixty days notice of a manufacturer's in-
tent to terminate a franchise and the right to an administrative hearing
on the fairness of the termination. 75
The FTC's developing piecemeal position was fleshed out in a 1986
report prepared by the Bureau of Economic's staff of the FTC, The
Effect of State Entry Regulation on Retail Automobile Markets.'76 Al-
172. Letter from Carol M. Thomas, Sec. FTC, to Rep. Roger Roy, Delaware H.R. (Jan. 26,
1983) (setting forth reasons that the FTC opposed the anticompetitive aspects of the proposed
SB 26 which amended Delaware's Motor Vehicle Franchising Act to restrict a manufacturer's
ability to establish or relocate a new point) (on file with committee).
173. Regulation of Motor Vehicle Dealer Franchises: Hearings on SB 103 Before the S.
Comm. on High. Transp. and Local Gov't, Ohio State Gen. Assembly (1987) (comments of the
Staff of the FTC) (on file with Florida State University Law Review).
174. Letter from William P. Golden, Acting Dir., Chicago Regional Office, FTC, to the
Hon. Lynn Adelman, Chairman, Wis. S. Comm. on Jud. & Cons. Affairs (June 19, 1987) (en-
dorsing a bill that would have repealed portions of that state's statute which allows an existing
dealer to challenge the establishment of an additional same line-make dealer) (on file with com-
mittee).
175. Id. at 5.
176. R. ROGERS, THE EFFECT OF STATE ENTRY REGULATION ON RETAIL AUTOMOBILE MARKETS
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though the report relied upon the empirical studies of Smith and Eck-
ard and sought to address the weaknesses it perceived therein, the
Bureau, like Eckard, limited its observations to the effect of state ad-
ditional dealer restrictions, 177 and not of general franchise regulations,
on the prices of new motor vehicles. The Bureau indicated that it im-
proved upon the studies in two ways. 178 First, the possibility that con-
ditions in the motor vehicle retail market, including the ability of
dealers to influence the political process, could affect the likelihood of
the enactment of entry restrictions was taken into account. This would
allow, the author believed, for more consistent estimates of the influ-
ence of the entry restrictions. 179 Second, variables were added that
would interact entry restrictions with absolute population growth. 80
Like Eckard, the Bureau used data based on Chevrolet motor vehicles
sold in 1978.181
It was reasoned that use of the same data would facilitate compari-
son of the author's results with Eckard's.'82 The Bureau found that in
the thirteen states having entry restrictions for at least two years, the
average price of 1978 Chevrolet motor vehicles was 6 70 higher than
motor vehicle prices in states without entry restrictions.'83 The Bureau
also found that entry restrictions have the greatest impact in rapidly
growing areas'8 4 and estimated that new motor vehicle prices in such
areas are increased 7.60%0 as a result of entry restriction.m5 The Bureau
concluded, therefore, that "the costs of these entry regulations are
much higher than previously estimated by Smith and Eckard." 186
(1986) (Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the FTC) (hereinafter ROGERS' REPORT]. In re-
sponse, the National Automobile Dealers' Association commissioned the Wharton Econometric
Forecasting Associates, Inc., to critique the FTC's study. That critique resulted in An Evaluation
of the Effects of RMA Laws on Auto Markets (Jan. 1987). When the FTC staff countered with
A. Mathios, Response to Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates' Comments on the Bu-
reau of Economics Study of Relevant Market Area Laws (June 3, 1987), Wharton responded
with Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc., A Response to the FTC's Critique of
an Evaluation of the Effects of RMA Laws on Auto Markets (June 1987).
177. ROGERS' REPORT, supra note 176, at 27-29.
178. Id. at 5.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 6.
181. Id. at 6-7.
182. Id. at 6.
183. Id. at 7-8.
184. According to population estimates by Donnelly Marketing Information Services, Flori-
da's population, which has grown 24.4% to 12,126,382 since 1980, is the third fastest growing
among the 50 states behind Alaska and Arizona. U.S. grew by 7.9% since '80, Miami Herald,
June 9, 1988, at Al, col 4.
185. See ROGERS' REPORT, supra note 176, at 7.
186. Id. at 109.
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D. Performance Audits
In addition to economic studies, the Legislature also evaluated the
results of performance audits. These audits were required by the stat-
ute and supported repeal.
1. Florida
In February 1986, the Florida State Auditor General's Office, as
part of an ongoing program of performance auditing required by stat-
ute, 187 published the results of its audit of sections 320.60 through
320.70, Florida Statutes. 88 The scope of the performance audit in-
cluded an assessment of the need for the regulatory program in pro-
tecting the public. 8 9 Although the office collected and analyzed data
from motor vehicle manufacturers, dealers, and the Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, it also relied heavily on the find-
ings of Smith and Eckard.
The office found that although the manufacturer licensing program
is intended to protect the consumer's access to the sale and servicing
of motor vehicles by regulating the motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer
relationship, the program is not only unnecessary for such purpose,
but harms consumers to the extent that it shelters dealers from compe-
tition and allows them to increase the price of new motor vehicles.
The office concluded that the program was unnecessary in that 89%
of all of the manufacturers' protested requests for additional dealer-
ships in Florida between 1972 and 1985 were granted by the Depart-
ment; the manufacturers had demonstrated inadequate representation
by the protesting incumbent dealers.190 Additionally, the office found
that during this same period, a significant percentage of the forty-
three dealers who protested their franchise cancellation as unfair
nonetheless had their franchises cancelled. Moreover, the office found
that the department had never suspended or revoked a manufacturer's
license or fined a manufacturer for unfair treatment of its dealers.
The office concluded that this data did not support the assumption
187. FLA. STAT. § 11.45(3)(a) (1987). The office of the Auditor General conducts annual
financial audits of state agencies and performance audits of all state programs within a 10-year
cycle. The office is removed from the legislative process and is not authorized to introduce legis-
lation. The inquiries and recommendations made pursuant to the regulatory sunset process
would require the office to unwisely depart from its current auditing function and become in-
volved in the daily legislative function.
188. FLORIDA OFFICE OF THE AUDrrOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
DEALER AND MANUFACTURER, FACTORY BRANCH, DISTRIBUTOR, AND IMPORTER LICENSING PRO-
GRAM ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES (1986).
189. Id. at vii.
190. Id. at 20.
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that manufacturers will overload markets or unfairly cancel franchises
if unregulated, and that dealers who believe they have been unfairly
treated by a manufacturer are already adequately protected both by
section 817.416, the state's franchise law of general application, and
the Federal DDCA. 191
The office further found that the entry restriction specifically
worked to inhibit competition by prohibiting the Department from
approving an application for a franchised dealership if the manufac-
turer is currently adequately represented in the market area by a
dealer who is complying with the terms of the franchise agreement.
Thus, if an existing dealer protests the proposed additional dealer, the
manufacturer must establish at an administrative hearing that the
dealer is inadequately representing the manufacturer. The office
found that even if the Department ultimately approves the additional
dealership, the effect of the delay resulting from the hearing is similar
to that resulting from a judicial temporary restraining order (TRO).192
Unlike the plaintiff requesting a TRO, however, the dealer is not re-
quired to meet the judicial precondition for such relief of demonstrat-
ing the likelihood of success on the merits. 93 Relying heavily on the
conclusions of Smith and Eckard, the office found manufacturer
regulations create territorial market power for incumbent dealers and
protect inefficient dealers. This allows the establishment of local mo-
nopolies which result in higher product prices and lower quality
service for the consumer. The office concluded, therefore, that contin-
ued regulation of motor vehicle manufacturers is not only unnecessary
but shelters dealers from competition. and inflates new motor vehicle
prices to the detriment of new motor vehicle purchasers. The office
recommended that the Legislature repeal the motor vehicle manufac-
turer licensing program. No move, however, was made to repeal the
statute.
2. Tennessee
In 1986, the Tennessee State Comptroller of the Treasury conducted
a program audit of the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission.'9 The
191. Id. at 20-21.
192. Id. at 21.
193. Id. at 21-22.
194. TENNESSEE STATE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, PERFORMANCE AuDIT OF TIE TEN-
NESSEE MOTOR VEICLE COMMISSION (Mar. 27, 1986) [hereinafter TENNESSEE AuDrrJ. The Ten-
nessee Governmental Entity Review Law requires the Comptroller of the Treasury to conduct a
limited program review audit of the commission and to report to the Joint Government Opera-
tions Committee of the General Assembly. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-29-111 (Supp. 1988). The audit
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Tennessee Comptroller, relying on sources similar to those relied upon
by the Florida Auditor General's Office, made similar findings. 95
Again, the findings of Smith and Eckard were relied upon for the
proposition that state regulation of the motor vehicle franchise rela-
tionship have gone far beyond their original purpose of protecting
dealers from manufacturer abuse to create local monopoly power for
the benefit of existing dealers and to the detriment of the public.196 As
a result of this audit, the Comptroller recommended repeal of the stat-
ute. The statute, however, was not repealed.
III. OTHER STATES' SUNSET REVIEWS
Forty-six states regulate the motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer rela-
tionship.'19 Curiously, however, according to A Schedule of State
Sunset Reviews, of the thirty-six states which have enacted sunset
laws, only four, Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Florida, and Nebraska, sub-
ject the motor vehicle manufacturer licensing provisions to sunset re-
view.198 As noted, Florida has twice conducted such sunset review,
once in 1980 and again in 1988, and both times recommended that the
Legislature allow the provisions to repeal as not in the public interest.
In addition, Pennsylvania conducted sunset review of its statute in
1983 as did Hawaii in 1986.' 99 Both similarly recommended repeal.
A. Pennsylvania
In 1983, the Pennsylvania Legislative Budget and Finance Commit-
tee evaluated the state's motor vehicle manufacturer licensing pro-
gram to determine the value of its continued existence, and whether
the program was operating in the public interest. As a result, the
Committee issued A Sunset Performance Audit of the Pennsylvania
was intended to assist the Joint Government Operations Committee in determining whether the
Commission should be abolished, continued, or restructured. One of the objectives of the audit
was to evaluate the need for the licensing and regulation of the motor vehicle industry, including
manufacturers.
195. TENNESSEE AUDrr, supra note 194, at 2.
196. Id.
197. See supra note 61.
198. THE NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON LICENSURE, ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATION, SUN-
SET, A SCHEDULE OF STATE SUNSET REvIEws 15-18 (1983).
199. Nebraska's report, REPORT OF THE PERFORMANCE REVIEw AND AUDIT COMMITTEE ON
THE NEBRASKA MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD (1979), issued prior to the 1980
FLORIDA SUNSET REVIEW, indicated that of the 8 additional franchise hearings conducted from
1972 to 1978, 4 were granted and 4 were denied, and of the 10 termination hearings conducted
during that same period, 8 were terminated and 2 were not. Id. at 29. From this, the Committee
concluded that the Board has impacted upon commerce but not "significantly," and that the
denials issued did not "significantly" affect the price of new motor vehicles. Id. at 36.
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State Board of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Sales-
men.2 00' The Committee, apparently relying on the sunset report pub-
lished by the Florida Senate Transportation Committee in 1980,201
recommended that Pennsylvania's motor vehicle manufacturer licens-
ing program be discontinued. However, the legislative committee's
recommendation was disregarded, and, as a result, motor vehicle
manufacturers doing business in Pennsylvania remain subject to state
regulation of their franchise relationship.
B. Hawaii
In the 1986 Hawaii Sunset Evaluation Report,20 2 the Office of the
Legislative Auditor staff found, as did the court in S.B. McMaster,
Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,203 that, "we do not believe that special
statutory protection is warranted for dealers who enter freely into
these franchise agreements. Dealers are not coerced into becoming
franchisees.' '204
The staff noted that in the preceding three years, only nine of the
600 motor vehicle related complaints filed by Hawaii consumers were
against manufacturers, and that no dealer complaints had been filed
against manufacturers; 20 5 manufacturers were found to conduct busi-
ness with other members of the industry who have the expertise and
resources to protect their interests. Further, several federal laws were
cited that were argued to already provide adequate dealer remedies. 206
200. PENNSYLVANIA COMM. ON LEGIS. BUDGET AND FIN., A SUNSET PERFORMANCE AuDrr- OF
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE BOARD OF MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS, DEALERS AND SALESMEN
(1983).
201. Id. at 38. A letter included in the audit from R. Dario, Executive Director of the Penn-
sylvania Committee on Legislative Budget and Finance, indicates that a draft of the audit was
provided to members of the Pennsylvania State Board of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers
and Salesmen. Id. In response to undisclosed criticisms of the board, "certain statements set
forth in the draft (and commented on in the following letter) have been deleted and do not
appear in this final version of the report." Id. at 36. The reference to the 1980 FLORIDA SUNSET
REVIEW is contained in those comments, but the conclusions of the Pennsylvania Committee
staff did not survive.
202. HAWAII STATE LEGIS. AUDIT. SUNSET EVALUATION REPORT, MOTOR VEHCLE INDUSTRY
LICENSING, CHAPTER 437, HAWAII REVISED STATUTES, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND TH-E
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAII (1986) (on file with committee) [hereinafter HAWAII SUN-
SET REVIEW].
203. 3 F.2d 469 (E.D.S.C. 1925).
204. HAWAII SUNSET REVIEW, supra note 202, at 43.
205. Id. at 44.
206. Id. at 43-44. The Dealers Day in Court Act, later amended as the Automobile Dealers
Franchise Act, it was argued, adequately provided safeguards for dealers from unfair, capri-
cious, or arbitrary manufacturer conduct by allowing a dealer to enjoin a manufacturer in fed-
eral district court from unfairly terminating a franchise agreement until a hearing is held to
determine that the manufacturer is acting in "good faith."
1988l
732 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:697
Additionally, unconvinced that unregulated manufacturers would im-
plement abusive business practices that would jeopardize the availabi-
lity of motor vehicles, parts, and services, the staff recommended that
the Legislature repeal the state's manufacturer licensing require-
ment. 20 7 That legislative recommendation, however, was disregarded
by the Hawaii Legislature and motor vehicle manufacturers remain
subject to state regulation of their franchise relationship with their
dealers .208
IV. FLORIDA'S 1988 SUNSET REVIEW
In 1988, pursuant to chapter 81-318, Laws of Florida, Florida's mo-
tor vehicle manufacturer licensing program was again scheduled for
sunset review and automatic repeal.2 9 Again, the Senate President as-
signed the review to the Senate Transportation Committee and, again,
the Speaker of the House assigned sunset review by that House to the
Regulatory Reform Committee. 210 On June 24, 1987, however, Sena-
tor Gwen Margolis, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on
Economic, Community and Consumer Affairs, requested Senate Pres-
ident Vogt to make that Committee the Committee of second refer-
ence as to the upcoming sunset review project l.2 1  Senator Vogt
responded, instead, by withdrawing sunset review from the Senate
Transportation entirely and making the Senate Economic, Commu-
207. Id. at 45.
208. HAW. REv. STAT. § 437 (Supp. 1987).
209. Ch. 81-318, 1981 Fla. Laws 1492 (amending FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1987)).
210. 1988 SuNsEr REvraw, supra note 8.
211. Letter from Fla. Sen. Gwen Margolis, Dem., North Miami, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Econ., Comm'y & Cons. Affairs, to Fla. Sen. John Vogt, S. President, Dem., Merritt Island,
1974-1988 (June 24, 1987) (on file with committee). The letter indicated that the staff of the
Committee had issued an interim report in March 1987 reviewing chapter 681, the "Motor Vehi-
cle Warranty Enforcement Act," commonly referred to as the "Lemon Law." That report de-
scribed the existing lemon law as unable to provide Florida consumers with a viable settlement
procedure by which they could resolve motor vehicle repair disputes. Since a compromise could
not be reached by the motor vehicle manufacturer, dealer, and consumer representatives during
the 1987 legislative session, Senator Margolis expressed the hope that the upcoming sunset review
of motor vehicle manufacturer and dealer licensing programs would provide another opportunity
to amend the lemon law. The dealers, indifferent to amending the lemon law during the 1987
legislative session but eager for further motor vehicle manufacturer regulation, might express
support for the improved lemon law in the 1988 session if their proposals for further state regu-
lation of the franchise relationship were favorably received. The manufacturers, as a result,
might find themselves in the unenviable position of opposing both further state regulation of
their franchise relationship and an improved lemon law, without an ally. They, not dealers,
would be ultimately liable for the replacement or repurchase of defective motor vehicles pur-
chased by consumers who prevail in lemon law arbitration.
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nity and Consumer Affairs Committee the Committee of first refer-
ence.
212
In April 1988, the Senate Economic, Community and Consumer
Affairs Committee issued its sunset report of the state's motor vehicle
dealer and manufacturer licensing program. As in 1980, the House
Regulatory Reform Committee conducted an abbreviated sunset re-
view of the provisions, but made no pre-session recommendation to
the Legislature. The sunset findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions made in the committee report, therefore, are the only such re-
commendations made to the Legislature. The Committee sunset
report, as did the 1980 Senate Transportation Committee sunset re-
port, recommended that the Legislature allow the motor vehicle man-
ufacturer licensing program to repeal as not in the public interest. 213
While the conclusions and recommendations of both Senate Commit-
tees were similar, the findings of the Senate Economic, Community
and Consumer Affairs Committee were more comprehensive than
those of 1980 for two reasons. First, the motor vehicle manufacturer
licensing program in Florida had been amended since 1980 to greatly
extend the state's regulation of the franchise relationship between the
manufacturer and it dealers. In 1980, the Senate Transportation Com-
mittee staff focused on what remains the core of that regulation: the
state's regulation of the manufacturer's ability to terminate a dealer's
franchise and the additional dealer entry restriction. In 1988, the staff
considered the impact of both of these statutory restrictions on manu-
facturers as well as those subsequently enacted in 1980 and 1984.
Second, in the 1980-1988 interim, much attention had been given to
franchise provisions included in many states' motor vehicle manufac-
turer licensing statutes in the 1970s and early 1980s. Economists pub-
lished the results of empirical studies of the economic impact of motor
vehicle franchise regulations on new motor vehicle prices and recom-
mended repeal. 214 The FTC had prepared comments at the request of
several state legislators and issued a report consolidating those com-
ments and recommending repeal of motor vehicle manufacturer
restrictions. Two states, including Florida, had conducted perform-
ance audits of motor vehicle manufacturer licensing programs and
concluded they were not only unnecessary to protect the dealers but
212. Senator Margolis insisted that the manufacturers and dealers agree to an improved ver-
sion of the existing lemon law in the 1988 legislative session before issues relating to sunset
review of the motor vehicle franchise provisions, scheduled for automatic repeal on October 1,
1988, would be addressed. Tougher 'Lemon Law' May Grow Out of Dispute, Car Dealers, Mak-
ers Headed for Showdown, Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
213. 1988 SUNSET REVmW, supra note 8, at 184.
214. See Smith, supra note 155; Eckard, supra note 96.
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adversely affected consumers. And two other states, Pennsylvania and
Hawaii, conducted sunset reviews of their franchise provisions and
recommended that the provisions be allowed to repeal. 215 In preparing
the 1988 Sunset Review, the Economics, Community and Consumer
Affairs Committee staff relied on much of this information.
The proliferation of legislation regulating the franchise relationship
enacted after the 1980 sunset recommendation to repeal did not dis-
tract the focus of the 1988 Sunset Review from the two core provi-
sions: the state's regulation of a manufacturer's right to terminate a
dealer's franchise, or "unfair cancellation," and the state's restriction
on the establishment of additional dealers, or "entry restriction." In
fact, the report expressly stated that these two provisions:
arguably comprise the core upon which the balance of the state's
regulation of the franchise relationship is based, if not dependent.
Therefore, if it is found that these first two provisions withstand
sunset review, the balance of the provisions must be more closely
scrutinized to determine the existence of individual public purpose. If
it is found, however, that the first provisions do not survive the
sunset review criteria, the balance of the provisions should fall, in
varying degrees, like dominoes.21 6
A. Restrictions on a Manufacturer's Right to Terminate
First, section 320.641, was examined for public purpose. Since it
was noted that the statute itself was not prefaced with an express
statement of purpose, the staff turned to case law where it found that
public purpose of section 320.641, Florida Statutes, had been deduced
by the Third District Court of Appeals in J.R. Furlong, Inc. v. Chrys-
ler Corp.21 7 The lower court, finding no legitimate basis upon which to
create a unilateral award of attorneys fees and costs to a prevailing
dealer in a termination hearing "between two private parties, with no
public interest at issue," struck the provision on equal protection
grounds.21 8 The court, reversing, concluded:
If no public interest were at stake here, there would be no need for
the extensive regulation undertaken by the legislature of motor
vehicle manufacturers, factory branches, distributors or importers
. .. and the entire statutory scheme would be unconstitutional....
215. See supra notes 200, 202 and accompanying text.
216. 1988 SUNSET REviaw, supra note 8, at 102.
217. 419 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
218. Id. at 387-88.
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In particular, there would be no need for the legislature to give a
motor vehicle dealer some protection against unfair discontinuation
or cancellation of his franchise agreements with a motor vehicle
manufacturer, factory branch, distributor or importer.... The
legislature, however, has taken the view that this regulation is
necessary in order to equalize the conceded difference in bargaining
power between the two parties here and to accord some protection to
the motor vehicle dealer as the weaker of the two parties.219
The staff indicated that the public purpose presumed by the court in
Furlong was more narrowly construed than the public purpose con-
templated by sunset review. The purpose of this provision was to di-
rectly protect dealers by giving them the right to protest and enjoin a
manufacturer's termination of the franchise and not to protect the
motor vehicle buying public from direct manufacturer misconduct. 2 0
Further, the staff found that in the five years preceding sunset review,
only 15 of the 1,200 annually franchised dealers had sought a hearing
on the fairness of a manufacturer's proposed termination of a fran-
chise, and of those, only one dealer had prevailed . 2 2 From this, the
staff concluded that those seeking reenactment of the provision had
failed to carry their burden of proving that the public contemplated
by sunset review would be subject to identifiable significant harm if
the provision were not reenacted.
B. Restrictions on a Manufacturer's Establishment of a Franchise
Second, section 320.642, was examined for public purpose. While it
was again noted that no express statement of purpose prefaced the
statute, the public purpose of the entry restriction was found, as it
had been found by the Senate Transportation Committee in 1980, to
have been held by the courts in Plantation Datsun v. Calvin,222 and
Bill Kelley Chevrolet v. Calvin,2 23 to be "to prevent powerful manu-
facturers from taking unfair advantage of their dealers by overloading
a market area" and not to foster combinations to prevent the intro-
duction of dealer competition. 224 In addition, the staff cited Dave
Zinn Toyota, Inc. v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehi-
cles, 2 5 wherein the Third District Court of Appeals agreed that the
219. Id. at 388.
220. 1988 SUNSET REVIEW, supra note 8, at 107-08.
221. Id. at 108.
222. 275 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
223. 322 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
224. 1988 SUNSET REvIEw, supra note 8, at 109.
225. 432 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
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purpose of section 320.642 was to protect incumbent franchised
dealers .226
The staff stated that a finding that motor vehicle dealers are the
primary intended beneficiaries of the entry restriction did not preclude
a finding that the public may benefit, if only secondarily or inciden-
tally, from the provision. Relying on the conclusions of Smith, Eck-
ard, the FTC, and the Florida Auditor General, however, the staff
concluded that the entry restriction adversely affects Florida consum-
ers in that it has resulted in an "undeterminable but significant" in-
crease in new motor vehicle prices. 227 The staff reasoned that a
regulation which increases the cost of goods to the consumer might
still be justified if it protects the public from significant harm. Noting
that of the 625 franchise dealer applications filed with the department
in the preceding five years, only 27 were subject to an additional
dealer protest and of those, only one of a manufacturer's proposed
dealers was denied a license based on adequate representation by the
existing dealer, 2 1 the staff concluded that those seeking reenactment
of these two provisions had failed to meet their burden.
C. Other Statutory Protest Rights Distinguished and Policy
Considerations
The staff also distinguished the similar statutory rights to protest
afforded interested parties in the license application process of three
other regulated business entities: banks, cemeteries, and health care
facilities. 229 While such rights to protest were afforded by the state to
226. Id.
227. 1988 SUNSET REVIEW, supra note 8, at 116.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 118-20. After the Department of Banking and Finance (DBF) has determined,
pursuant to section 658.20, Florida Statutes, that a need for a bank exists in the service area
where the proposed bank is to be located, notice of the intent to approve the application for
charter is published. Any person may request a public hearing within 21 days of such notice but
Rule 3C-9.006 of the Florida Administrative Code limits those who may participate in the hear-
ing to: (1) the applicant, (2) the department, and (3) persons with a substantial interest in the
decision. The public purpose of the code as stated in section 658.14, is the safe conduct of banks
and trust companies. Similarly, after the DBF has determined, pursuant to the Florida Cemetery
Act, section 497..006, that a need for a cemetery does not exist in the community where the
proposed cemetery is to be located, the applicant must request a hearing on the Department's
denial within 21 days after the receipt of notice of denial. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 3D-30.015
(1987). The public purpose of the code as expressed in section 497.002, Florida Statutes, is "that
purchasers of preneed burial rights or cemetery merchandise may suffer serious economic harm
if purchase money is not set aside for future use as intended by the purchaser and that the failure
to maintain cemetery grounds properly may cause significant emotional stress." Finally, after
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has determined to issue or deny a certifi-
cate of need for a new health care facility in the proposed service district pursuant to section
19881 SUNSET REVIEW
protect a clearly identifiable public interest, the staff maintained, the
right to protest an additional dealer afforded incumbent dealers was
created by the state not to protect the public but to protect incumbent
franchised dealers from market overloading by a manufacturer. More-
over, the staff, citing American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of
Motor Vehicles, 230 indicated that policy considerations weaken the ar-
gument that the motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer relationship is suf-
ficiently unique to compel such statutory protection. The staff noted
that the court, in finding a similar Virginia entry restriction unconsti-
tutional as violative of the commerce clause, 23 1 had concluded:
The shape of American commerce has been transformed by the
proliferation of all types of chain and franchise business operations.
Motels, drug stores, fast food restaurants, ice cream shops, variety
and department stores, tire dealers and numerous other businesses
frequently operate under the franchise system. If Virginia were
permitted to utilize section 46.1-547(d) to keep additional motor
vehicle franchises out of areas of high unemployment and slow
population growth, it could enact similar statutes to bar all types of
additional franchises from what it views to be economically weak
markets. Under such circumstances, the State, rather than the
marketplace, would become the arbiter of the appropriate level of
competition in each franchised industry. 232
381.709, the applicant or aggrieved existing health care facilities must request a hearing on the
issue within 21 days of notice of intent to issue or deny. FLA. STAT. § 381.709(5)(a) (1987). The
public purpose of regulating health-related projects, as expressed in section 381.025, is to im-
prove the health and well-being of the state's citizens by striving to improve health care services.
230. 445 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Va. 1978), rev'd, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
836 (1979).
231. 1988 SuNsEr REVIEW, supra note 8, at 121. This decision predated the landmark United
States Supreme Court decision New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox, Corp., 439 U.S. 96
(1978), wherein the Court upheld the constitutionality of the California additional dealer entry
restriction. The Court found that the entry restriction did not deny a manufacturer due process
of law because such interests are always subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by a "general
scheme of business regulation." Id. at 106. The Court also concluded that such restrictions did
not conflict with the Sherman Act in that the entry restriction fell within the "state action"
exception. Id. at 109. The Virginia state case was one of four which had, just prior to Orrin W.
Fox, resulted in conflicting opinions on the issue of whether state entry restrictions unconstitu-
tionally burden interstate commerce. Compare Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Board, 89
Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979) and Tober Foreign Motors v. Reiter Oldsmobile,
381 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1978) with American Motor Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles,
592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1979) and General GMC Trucks v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373,
237 S.E.2d 194, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977). The Supreme Court, curiously, failed to ad-
dress these cases, apparently leaving the commerce clause as a viable challenge to entry restric-
tion provisions. See Note, State Motor Vehicle Franchise Legislation: A Survey and Due Process
Challenge to Board Composition, 33 VAND. L. REv. 385, 409-10 (1980). Sunset review, however,
focuses on public purpose, and not constitutional issues.
232. 1988 SuNsiT REvtaw, supra note 8, at 121 (citing American Motor Service Corp. v.
Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d at 219).
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D. The Balance
After demonstrating that the cancellation and additional dealer en-
try restrictions do not survive sunset review, the staff turned its atten-
tion to the balance of the provisions enacted to regulate the franchise
relationship.2 33 Most of the provisions were found to be innocuous but
unnecessary in that, while they might not result in increased product
prices, they addressed terms already present in the negotiated fran-
chise agreement or covered by tort law.
These relatively harmless provisions included disciplinary grounds
for a manufacturer's failure to indemnify a dealer who has paid on a
claim related to the defective manufacture of a vehicle, part, or acces-
sory, and regulation of manufacturer activity related to dealership
succession.2 14 The provisions regulating a manufacturer's change in
plans or systems of distribution, 235 the transfer, assignment, or sale of
franchise agreements, 23 6 changes of executive management control of
a dealership, 23 7 a manufacturer's reimbursement of a dealer's war-
ranty related work,238 and the provision providing treble damages for
dealers who prevail in an action based on a manufacturer's violation
of the statute were also included.23 9 The provisions requiring the licen-
sure of foreign motor vehicle manufacturers, however, benefited fran-
chised dealers of foreign motor vehicles to the extent they subjected
such licensees to Florida jurisdiction. 240 The mandatory agency provi-
sion benefited such dealers to the extent it created the fiction that the
distributor of a motor vehicle is the producer of that motor vehicle. 241
E. Florida's 1988 Sunset Recommendations
As a result of such findings, the staff concluded, as did the Senate
Transportation Committee staff in 1980, that those seeking reenact-
ment of the motor vehicle manufacturer licensing program had failed
to meet their burden of establishing a public purpose and proving that
significant harm would befall the public if the reviewed regulation
were allowed to repeal.2 42 The staff recommended that all but a few
233. Id.
234. FLA. STAT. § 320.64(16), (18) (1987).
235. Id. § 320.6415.
236. Id. § 320.643.
237. Id. § 320.644.
238. Id. § 320.696.
239. Id. § 320.697.
240. Id. § 320.61(1)(c).
241. Id. § 320.6405.
242. Id.
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minor isolated provisions be allowed to repeal as not in the public
interest.
F. A Foreboding of Dealer Influence
Two novel moves were made relating to the 1988 sunset report.
First, the analysis of the additional dealer entry restriction included a
lengthy discussion of several less anti-competitive alternatives that, if
adopted, would temper the impact of the existing additional dealer
entry restriction. 24 Acknowledging that all entry restrictions impede
competition, by either delaying or preventing the establishment of new
dealer points, the staff juggled the entry restrictions of many other
states24 which also regulated the establishment of new points to flesh
out the least anti-competitive alternatives to Florida's existing provi-
sion. These alternatives included the statutory creation of a bifurcated
relevant market area responsive to population density and the statu-
tory reduction of the protest period afforded dealers from about
thirty days to fifteen days.
The staff also suggested reducing the standard for determining
whether a manufacturer can grant an additional franchise from its
ability to demonstrate the existing dealer's inadequate representation
to a manufacturer's ability to demonstrate a substantial rational basis
243. Id.
244. Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 8-20-3(13), -4(3)(1) (Supp. 1988); Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-1301, -1304.02 (Supp. 1987); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2305(k)(1-5), -2303
(1987); California: CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 507, 3062 (West 1986); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§
12-6-102(4), -120(1)(h), -122(3) (Supp. 1987); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-133r, -
133dd (West 1988); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4902, 4915 (Supp. 1986); Florida: FLA.
STAT. § 320.642 (Supp. 1988); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 49-2417 (1986); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
121 1/2, para. 752, 754, 762 (Supp. 1988); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 322A.1, .16 (West 1988);
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.47 (Baldwin 1988); Lousiana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
32:1252-54 (West 1988); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1174-A (Supp. 1987); Massachu-
setts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93B, § 4(3)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1983); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 445-1566, -1576 (West Supp. 1988); Minnesota: MNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80E.03, .14
(West 1986); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-201, -205 to -207 (1987); Nebraska: NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 60-1401.02, -1422, -1424, -1425, -1427, -1437 (1984); Nevada: NEV. REv. STAT. §§
482.3634, .36357, .36358, .36361, .36363 (1986); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
357-C:1, :9 (Supp. 1987); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-16, -18, -19, -20, -23 (West
1988); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-16-3, -5 (1978); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 20-286, -305 (Supp. 1987); Ohio: OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4517.50, .51, .57, .65 (Baldwin
1987); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 578, 579 (West 1987); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §
650.150 (1983); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 818.2, .18 (Purdon 1988); Rhode Is-
land: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5.1-1, -5.1-4.2 (Supp. 1988); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFID LAWS
ANN. §§ 32-6A-2, -3, -4, -9, -12 (Supp 1988); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-17-114(20)
(Supp. 1988); Texas: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), §§ 4.06, 5.02(13) (Vernon Supp.
1988); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-14-5 to -9 (1986); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
4098(c) (1984); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §§ 17A-6A-3, -12 (1986); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 218.01(1)(r), 3(f)l (West 1987).
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for its proposal. The staff offered an alternative if the Legislature did
not adopt the "rational basis" standard and, instead, followed the
majority "good cause" standard. It suggested that the Legislature
could weaken the anti-competitive impact of such standard by adopt-
ing a list of factors to be considered in determining whether a manu-
facturer has demonstrated good cause for an additional dealer point.
The factors focused primarily on the impact of the new point on the
public rather than the complaining dealer. The staff suggested that the
burden of proof be shifted from the manufacturers to the complain-
ant, the protesting dealer, to prove a positive, adequate representa-
tion. It noted that contrary to the rules of civil procedure, the
respondent-manufacturer is required to prove a negative. The staff
also suggested reducing the dealer's burden from adequate representa-
tion to the unreasonableness of the manufacturer's proposed point. In
addition, finding that the statute did not limit the amount of time that
may elapse between the time the protest is filed and the time a final
decision must be rendered before the proposed point is deemed ap-
proved, the staff recommended that the entry restriction be amended
to require that the final decision be rendered within sixty days of fil-
ing. In finding that the mere filing of an unsupported protest by a
probable competitor can delay the establishment of a proposed and
ultimately approved new point for up to two years, the staff proposed
that the Legislature provide, as a disincentive, that costs and attor-
neys' fees be awardable to the prevailing party in an administrative
hearing. Typically, a sunset report does not contain such a developed
range of alternatives inconsistent with the recommendation of the re-
port.
Second, the staff's report is generally accompanied by a PCB re-
flecting recommendations contained in the report, in this instance, a
bill repealing the existing statute. Instead, anticipating the improbabil-
ity of repeal and the strength of the dealer lobby, the staff prepared a
PCB reenacting the existing statute. 245 The 1988 Legislature heeded
neither the sunset recommendation to repeal, nor the PCB simply
reenacting the existing statute. Instead it passed House Bill 1683246
which was based on a lengthy dealer-drafted amendment to the Senate
companion reenactment bill, Committee Substitute for Senate Bill
982. The two moves had been unsuccessful.
245. Florida Senate Bill 982 (1988) would have reenacted sections 320.60-71, Florida
Statutes, relating to the licensing of motor vehicle manufacturers, factory branches, distributors,
and importers, and scheduled the provisions for automatic repeal on Oct. 1, 1998, and for sunset
review prior to that date.
246. Fla. HB 1683 (1988).
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G. The Aftermath of Dealer Influence247
While the bill focused on increasing the state's regulation of a man-
ufacturer's establishment of additional dealer points, it substantially
amended other provisions addressing the franchise relationship to ex-
pand generally the state's regulation. For instance, section 320.61,
Florida Statutes, was amended to impose licensure of any manufac-
turer, importer, or distributor which issues an agreement to a motor
vehicle dealer in the state as a precondition to the sale or lease of mo-
tor vehicles in the state. 248 The section was also amended to subject
any licensed manufacturer, importer, or distributor, as well as any un-
licensed foreign motor vehicle manufacturers whose product is sold or
leased in Florida, to the jurisdiction of Florida courts in any action
for relief provided in the statute. 249 Such provisions apparently work
to deprive manufacturers, importers, or distributors of a jurisdictional
due process challenge. In addition, although there was no finding that
manufacturers were offering dealers franchise agreements containing
terms inconsistent with Florida law, section 320.63 was amended to
require that all franchise agreements offered to Florida dealers pro-
vide that all terms therein inconsistent with the law are void. 20 The
section was also amended to require manufacturers to annually report
to the Department its efforts to add new minority dealer points. 25'
Section 320.64 was amended to clarify the Department's authority
to discipline a licensee upon proof of a pattern of misconduct, to clar-
247. During the 1988 legislative session, General Motors and Ford engaged in defensive lob-
bying. Their presence could be construed as reflecting only residual interest from their primary
interest in the Florida Legislature's lemon law activity in both the 1987 and 1988 legislative ses-
sions. Their reference to repeal was brisk and quickly tempered by the legislators' clearly com-
municated pro-dealer sentiment.
The manufacturers' proposed amendments included defining "community or territory" as a
bifurcated relative market area (RMA). In those counties with more than 275,000 people, the
manufacturers proposed an RMA comprised of the circular area around the proposed site which
contains 275,000 people. In those counties with less than 275,000 people, the manufacturers
proposed the RMA to be the county or a 15-mile radius around the proposed site, whichever is
greater. The manufacturers additionally proposed repealing section 320.6405, which imposes
agency status on motor vehicle manufacturers. The manufacturers proposed amending section
320.642, to remove from them the express burden of showing a dealer's inadequate representa-
tion, to require the department to render an additional dealer decision within 100 days, and to
address relocation of an existing point. The manufacturers also proposed amending section
320.643, relating to transfers, and section 320.644, relating to changes of executive management
control, to result in more manufacturer control of such transfers and changes. Finally, the man-
ufacturers proposed amending section 320.697, relating to civil damages, to delete the reference
to treble damages for violations of the statute.
248. Ch. 88-395, § 5, 1988 Fla. Laws 2290, 2297 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.61(1) (Supp.
1988)).
249. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.61(5) (Supp. 1988)).
250. Id. § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2298 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.63(3) (1987)).
251. Id.
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ify that a manufacturer may not refuse to accept a successor dealer
who is a legal heir or devisee unless it can prove the proposed succes-
sor does not meet certain standards, and to expressly place the burden
of proof on the manufacturer.2 2 The amendment added four new
grounds for disciplinary action against a manufacturer, including: (1)
the establishment by a manufacturer of an inequitable and unreasona-
bly discriminatory system of motor vehicle allocation or distribution;
(2) the intentional delay, refusal, or failure of a manufacturer to de-
liver vehicles, parts, or accessories; (3) the requirement by a manufac-
turer that a dealer assent to a release, or other action, which would
relieve any person from liability under sections 320.60 through 320.70;
and (4) the coercion of a dealer by a manufacturer to waive his right
to protest the establishment or relocation of an additional dealer in
the coerced dealer's area. 253
Section 320.6403 was created to provide dealer successor language
relative to distributor agreements. 254 The new section prohibits the re-
fusal by a manufacturer or importer to accept the lawfully designated
successor to a distributor agreement as provided by will or as desig-
nated by the distributor during his lifetime, and allows the rejection of
a successor only if demonstrated to be significantly detrimental to the
interest of the public, manufacturer or importer. Section 320.6405 was
amended to extend the state's jurisdiction over manufacturers not li-
censed pursuant to the statute, as well as licensees. 255 An exemption
from the agency relationship was carved out to exclude domestic man-
ufacturers distributing vehicles in Florida under their own brand
name, but which are substantially manufactured by another entity, if
such entity is substantially engaged in the manufacture of other line-
make motor vehicles and is licensed as a manufacturer in Florida.25 6
As a result, the foreign manufacturer, and not the distributor, would
be subject to possible penalties for violation of the statute.
Section 320.641, relating to the termination of franchise agree-
ments, was amended to require a manufacturer to provide a dealer
with fifteen day's notice of its intent to discontinue the franchise
agreement when the manufacturer determines that a dealer has aban-
doned the franchise, and for a dealer to file for a hearing on whether
252. Id. § 8, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2299, 2301 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.64, 320.64(18)
(1987)).
253. Id. § 8, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2301-02 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.64(20)-(23) (Supp.
1988)).
254. Id. § 9, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2302 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.6403 (Supp. 1988)).
255. Id. § 10, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2303 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.6405 (1987)).
256. Id.
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an abandonment has occurred. 2 7 The period during which a manufac-
turer is prohibited from appointing a replacement dealer was extended
to include the exhaustion of all appellate remedies by the discontinued
dealer if a stay is issued by the Department or appellate court. 28
Section 320.643, relating to the transfer of franchise agreements,
was amended to allow a manufacturer, after notice of a dealer's intent
to transfer his franchise, to file a complaint with the Department to
determine whether the proposed transferee is qualified to assume the
franchise. 25 9 Section 320.644, relating to a dealer's change of executive
management control, was amended to expressly provide that the ter-
mination of employment of executive management, including the
dealer-operator of such management, is not to be deemed a change of
executive management control or a transfer of a franchise. 260 Section
320.696, relating to a manufacturer's warranty reimbursement respon-
sibility, was amended to prohibit a manufacturer's reasonable com-
pensation to a dealer for warranty work of less than the amount the
dealer charges for similar non-warranty retail repairs unless the li-
censee can demonstrate that the dealer's labor charges are improper. 26'
The section also provides that compensation not paid by a manufac-
turer to a dealer within thirty days of dealer's notice of billings is to
be presumed untimely. 262
Section 320.699, relating to administrative hearing and adjudication
procedures, was created to outline a dealer's options already available
under administrative law in seeking redress for manufacturer conduct
which adversely affects the dealer. 263 The options include an adminis-
trative hearing pursuant to chapter 120 and a dealer protest hearing
pursuant to section 320.642. The 1988 Senate sunset report had indi-
cated that typically six to eighteen months elapsed from the time a
proposed dealer filed the preliminary application to the entry of a fi-
nal order. During the delay, the protesting dealer's competition is held
at bay, capital invested in the proposed point is tied up and rendered
unproductive, and the proposed location may be lost to another use.
Apparently to remedy this inequity, the section was created to require
that a protest hearing must be conducted within 180 days from the
date of the first filing of protest unless the hearing officer extends the
257. Id. § 11, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2304 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.641(5) (Supp. 1988)).
258. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.6405(7) (Supp. 1988)).
259. Id. § 13, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2308 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.643(1) (1987)).
260. Id. § 14, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2309-10 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.644(1) (1987)).
261. Id. § 16, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2310-11 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.696 (1987)).
262. Id.
263. Id. § 17, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2311 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.699 (Supp. 1988)).
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time for good cause. 264 The section was further designed not to deny
the Department jurisdiction of the issue if the hearing is not scheduled
within that time, but simply to authorize the parties to request such
hearing "which shall be held forthwith. ' 2 6 The newly created statu-
tory deadline, therefore, is not a forceful remedy which ensures timely
resolution of the dispute, but an illusory one couched in terms render-
ing it of dubious use. Section 320.6991 was created to prohibit a man-
ufacturer's reapplication for an additional or relocated dealer license
for two years where a manufacturer has dismissed the original appli-
cation on or after March 1, 1988, until June, 1988, the effective date
of the revised law. 26 This amendment was apparently intended to foil
any attempt by a manufacturer to benefit, if possible, from the newly
defined dealer protected areas from the time the proposed dealer-
drafted amendment containing the proposed areas was made public
until the time it was made law.
The majority of these amendments result in further state regulation
of the franchise relationship between a manufacturer and its dealers.
While most of these new provisions redundantly address terms already
addressed in the franchise agreement, they are relatively innocuous in
that they do not further restrict manufacturer conduct to the detri-
ment of the public any more than does the franchise agreement itself
or contract or tort law. One of the most salient features of the fran-
chise provisions has been the state's ability to restrict a manufactur-
er's ability to establish a new point. Section 320.642, a single statute
paragraph and an administrative rule in 1988, became, after the enact-
ment of House Bill 1683, seven pages of statute. The dealers had
flexed.
Section 320.642 had only required that the Department deny a man-
ufacturer's application for additional dealer license in any community
or territory where the manufacturer's presently franchised dealers
were both complying with the terms of their franchise agreements and
providing adequate representation in the community or territory for
such license. The burden of proof was placed on the manufacturer.
An administrative rule promulgated in 1976, Rule 15c-1.008, Florida
Administrative Code, required a manufacturer intending to establish
an additional point to notify the director of the Division of Motor
Vehicles of a dealer application prior to acquiring facilities necessary
for such point. The notification was required to disclose the location
264. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.699(2) (Supp. 1988)).
265. Id.
266. Id. § 18 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.6991 (Supp. 1988)).
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of the proposed point and the names of any other same line-make
dealers in the "surrounding trade areas, community or territory."
Upon receipt of the notification, the director was required to send no-
tice to the named dealers advising them of the provisions of section
320.642, and of their right to protest such establishment and obtain a
hearing on the issue. The determination by the director was effective
for twelve months from the date of the order or the date of the final
judicial determination in the event of an appeal, unless, for good
cause, the director had set a different period in the order. Since the
statute did not define "community or territory," Department policy
had been to construe the term to mean the county in which the pro-
posed point was located, and the counties adjacent to or surrounding
the one in which the new point was located.
Section 320.642 was amended in 1988 to elaborately codify an argu-
ably more restrictive variation of the administrative rule and Depart-
ment policy. 267 The section was amended to require a manufacturer to
give written notice to the Department of its intent to establish an addi-
tional dealership. 268 The notice must state not only the location of the
proposed dealership, the date on which the manufacturer intended to
begin business with the additional dealer, and the identity of all same
line-make franchised dealers in the county or any contiguous counties,
but also, the names and addresses of the dealer-operator and principal
investors in the proposed dealership. The Department, upon receipt of
such notice, was required to not only send a copy of the published
notice to all affected dealers, but to publish notice of the proposed
additional or relocating dealership in the Florida Administrative
Weekly. Dealers are now required to file their protest regarding the
proposed additional dealer within thirty days of receipt of such notice
by statute instead of by Department policy. The section was also
amended to reduce the former alternative ground for denying a manu-
facturer's application for an additional point, that is, that the protest-
ing dealer is complying with the terms of the franchise agreement, to a
factor that may be considered in determining whether the standard of
inadequate representation has been met. 269
Previously, case law had offered some guidance in determining the
issue of inadequate representation. One court, in Stewart Pontiac Co.
v. Department of Motor Vehicles & Highway Safety,270 held that evi-
dence of the financial impact of the proposed additional dealer point
267. Id. § 12, 1988 Fla. Laws at 2304-08 (amending FLA. STAT. § 320.642 (1987)).
268. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.642(1) (Supp. 1987)).
269. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.642(2)(b)(8) (Supp. 1988)).
270. 511 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
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on the protesting dealer was not admissible. Section 320.642 was
amended to offer eleven express factors which may be considered by
the hearing officer in resolving the issue of adequacy of representa-
tion. The first factor listed, curiously, is "[tihe impact of the estab-
lishment of the proposed or relocated dealer on the consumers, public
interest, existing dealers, and the licensee; provided, however, that fi-
nancial impact may only be considered with respect to the protesting
dealer or dealers." 71 In Dave Zinn Toyota, Inc. v. Department of
Motor Vehicles & Highway Safety, 272 the court rejected appellant's
contention that a manufacturer's restrictions on the number of motor
vehicles provided to each dealer precluded it from showing existing
dealers who had sold their alloted number inadequately represented
the territory. The court reasoned that the purpose of the entry regula-
tion is to prevent powerful manufacturers from taking unfair advan-
tage of their dealers, existing and prospective. The purpose was "not
to foster combinations to prevent the introduction of dealer competi-
tion which is reasonably justified in terms of market potential. '273
The fourth of the factors to be considered is a manufacturer's action
which affects a dealer's opportunity for growth, including its alloca-
tion of motor vehicles.
Where Department policy had been to send notice of the proposed
new point to same line-make dealers in the county of the proposed
point, or in the adjacent or adjoining counties, the section was
amended to statutorily define the RMA. The section was amended to
create an unprecedented RMA, bifurcated based on population, as
suggested in the 1988 Sunset Report, but amorphic and potentially
one of the largest in the nation based on less than a majority of the
sales and service of the protesting dealer. The larger the RMA, the
larger the dealer's protected area, and the greater both its anti-com-
petitive impact and resulting adverse impact on new motor vehicle
buyers.
The new additional dealer entry restriction provides that in counties
of less than 300,000 persons, a dealer is eligible to protest if the pro-
posed new or relocating dealership is within the area of responsibility
described in the franchise agreement of the existing dealer, and is
within a 20-mile radius.2 74 Also, the dealer can protest if he can estab-
271. Ch. 88-395, § 12, 1988 Fla. Laws 2290, 2305 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.642(2)(b)(1)
(Supp. 1988)).
272. 432 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
273. Id. at 1322 (quoting Bill Kelley Chevrolet v. Calvin, 322 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 1st DCA
1975)).
274. Ch. 88-395, § 12, 1988 Fla. Laws 2290, 2306 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.642(3)(a)1-2
(Supp. 1988)).
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lish that during any 12-month period of the 36-month period preced-
ing the filing of the proposed dealer's application, 25/0 of his new
motor vehicle retail sales were to persons whose registered household
addresses were within 20 miles of the proposed location. 275 In counties
of greater than 300,000 persons, a dealer is eligible to protest if the
proposed additional or relocating dealer is within 12.5 miles of the
existing dealer, and the dealer can establish that during any 12-month
period of the 36-month period preceding the filing of the proposed
dealer's application, 25076 of his new motor vehicle retail sales were to
persons whose households were located within 12.5 miles of the pro-
posed location. 276
As noted in the 1988 Sunset Report, only Massachusetts and
Virginia rely on an RMA defined by a dealer's actual sales or serv-
ice. 2'7 In Massachusetts, while all dealers within a 20-mile radius of
the proposed site receive notice of the proposed establishment, only
those dealers within the radius and who obtain two-thirds of their re-
tail sales or service, whichever is smaller, over the past three years or
the life of the dealership, whichever is less, are eligible to protest the
proposed new point. The Virginia statute refers to a "trade area"
which has been construed by the commissioner of motor vehicles to be
the area in which a dealership is expected to or does maintain the ma-
jority of sales or service of its franchised vehicles. The expansion of
the dealer's protected area with the reference to sales and service is
similar to those of Massachusetts and Virginia, but a Florida dealer
must only make 25076 of its retail sales and service in the proposed
area to be eligible to protest. In Massachusetts, a dealer must make
two-thirds of its sales in the proposed area, and in Virginia, at least
"a majority" of sales must be made within the area. A Florida dealer
with less proven stake in the proposed area can protest the proposed
establishment, thereby at least delaying local competition.
The additional dealer restriction, which previously addressed only
the establishment of a new point, was also amended to expressly ad-
dress the relocation of an existing point. Previously, the relocation of
a point had been governed by administrative law. Stone Buick, Inc. v.
Keelan Buick, Inc.271 provided that if the existing location of a relocat-
ing applicant was already in the "community or territory" of the pro-
testing dealer, and if the proposed relocation was within the same
"community or territory," then the proposed change of location does
275. Id., 1988 Fla. Laws at 2307-08 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.642(3)(a) 3 (Supp. 1988)).
276. Id., 1988 Fla. Laws at 2307 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.642(3)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
277. 1988 SUNSET REvLEw, supra note 8, at 124-25.
278. Div. of Admin. Hearings No. 84-4475 (Final Order May 20, 1985).
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not implicate the substantial interests of the protesting dealer pro-
tected within the zone of interest of section 320.642.279 If, however, an
applicant seeks to relocate from outside a protesting dealer's "com-
munity or territory" to inside it or seeks to relocate closer to the pro-
testing dealer's borders in such a way that the territories of the
protesting dealer and applicant overlap, it was found that such an in-
trusion upon the interests of the protesting dealer or an "injury in
fact" results to create standing in the protesting dealer.
Section 320.642 was amended to carefully construe when the re-
opening of a point is not an establishment of a new point subject to
protest.2 0 The Act provides that the opening or reopening of a dealer
within twelve months is not an additional dealer if: (1) it is within the
same or an adjacent county; or (2) the proposed location is further
from each existing same line-make dealer than the prior location is
from each such dealer within 25 miles of the new location; or (3) the
opening or reopening is within 6 miles of the prior location and, if any
existing such dealer is located within 15 miles of the former location,
the proposed location is no closer to any existing such dealer; or (4)
the opening or reopening is within 6 miles of the prior location, and if
all existing such dealers are beyond 15 miles of the former location,
the proposed location is further than 15 miles from any existing such
dealer. The relocation exception was circumscribed by the edict,
"[a]ny other such opening or reopening shall constitute an additional
motor vehicle dealer within the meaning of this section." 2s' As a result
of the enactment of House Bill 1683, where it was once silent, the
motor vehicle manufacturer licensing statute has been refined to elab-
orately address and restrict the relocation, as well as the establish-
ment, of a dealer point.
In 1980 and 1988, the Senate staff, finding no express legislative
intent, deduced from case law that the intent of the statute was to
protect incumbent dealers from manufacturer overloading of an area.
A new section was created in 1988 to apparently address the noted
silence and to provide express legislative intent in regulating motor ve-
hicle manufacturers. Notwithstanding overwhelming evidence that
such regulation benefits incumbent franchised dealers to the detriment
of new motor vehicle purchasers, and with no evidence of a pattern of
discrimination in the awarding of new dealer points, the section pro-
vides:
279. See also Haines City Motor Co. v. Barry Cook Ford, Inc., Div. of Admin. Hearings
No. 87-2918, (Interlocutory Order Aug. 24, 1987).
280. Ch. 88-395, § 12, 1988 Fla. Laws 2290, 2307-08 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 320.642(5)
(Supp. 1988)).
281. Id.
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It is the intent of the Legislature to protect the public health, safety
and welfare of the citizens of the state by regulating the licensing of
motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers, maintaining competition,
providing consumer protection and fair trade and providing
minorities with opportunities for full participation as motor vehicle
dealers. 28 2
Finally, House Bill 1683 provided for automatic repeal of both the
reenacted and newly created provisions on October 1, 1998, and
again, for sunset review of the statute by the Legislature. 283
H. Repealing Sunset
Within a decade of Colorado's 1976 act, the highly touted concept
of sunset review had caught the fancy of over thirty state legisla-
tures. 2M* The premise was appealingly simple. Certain state agencies
and regulatory programs, subjected to ambitious review schedules,
would automatically terminate unless specifically reauthorized pursu-
ant to a circumspect legislative review. Sunset review would return
government to its essential and less costly frame. With such high ex-
pectations, however, disenchantment soon set in. Some critics assailed
the high cost of reviews and relatively low resulting savings. Others
argued that the process had been neutralized by "a wave of lobbyists
who descended forcefully in state legislature. ' '285 By 1981, North Car-
olina had repealed its sunset statute. Mississippi followed in 1984 and
Nebraska in 1985. Five states have informally discontinued further'
sunset reviews.
In the 1987-1988 interim, the Florida Senate President directed the
Senate Committee on Governmental Operations to review Florida's
Regulatory Sunset and Sundown Acts to assess the laws and their im-
plementation, to evaluate their accomplishments, and to recommend
revisions if the review identified a need for change. Noting that no
statutory criteria exists for reviewing the sunset law itself, the staff
reviewed the 138 sunset reviews conducted in Florida between 1977
and 1987 to determine the cost and benefits of the law.28 6 The staff
found that the total cost of the reviews had been $1,467,784 and the
282. FLA. STAT. § 320.605 (Supp. 1988).
283. Ch. 88-395, § 21, 1988 Fla. Laws 2290, 2312.
284. TEN YEARS OF SUNSET, A SURVEY OF STATES' EXPERIENCE, COMPILED BY THE SOUTH
CAROLINA STATE REORGANIZATION COmMsSION 4 (1986).
285. Id.
286. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON GOVTL. Ops., A REVIEW OF THE SUNSET AND SUNDOWN
LAWS IN FLORIDA 67 (Mar. 1988) (on file with committee).
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current average cost of a Senate sunset review to be $10,909.27 Of the
nineteen regulatory laws repealed in that period, eleven regulated oc-
cupations and professions. 2 8 The major benefit of the sunset process
was found to be an intangible heightened legislative awareness of ex-
ecutive branch staff and functions, and the elimination of outdated
statutory provisioris.
The staff noted that the main factor motivating several states to
repeal their sunset statutes altogether had been the imbalance between
costs and benefits and that a similar imbalance had resulted in Flor-
ida. While the report focused on a cost-benefit analysis of the sunset
review process, the staff found that one weakness of the sunset proc-
ess is its failure to consider the political impact of the lobbying groups
associated with most regulated professions.28 9 Noting that such groups
are influential because they represent large numbers of regulated
professionals, the staff concluded that sunset laws provide such
groups with "an additional point of entry into the legislative system"
and "a forum for imposing stricter regulations rather than for reliev-
ing practitioners of some of the regulations imposed. ' '290 The sunset
review process is subject to such abuse when it results in more restric-
tive legislation with no corresponding public benefit. That has been
the case with harbor pilots, barbers, and cosmetologists, or when an
unregulated profession becomes regulated as a result of the sunset re-
view of another profession, such as architects and interior designers.
The staff concluded that consumers, the group sunset laws were de-
signed to protect, comprise the group least likely to participate in the
sunset review process.
As a result, the staff recommended that both the sunset and sun-
down acts be scheduled to repeal in 1992 and be subject to prior legis-
lative review, and that statutory criteria be added to guide such
review. While Senate Bill 1057, which contained provisions reflecting
the recommendations of the committee, passed enthusiastically in the
Senate by a vote of 31 to 0, it died in the House Committee on Regu-
latory Reform, the substantive committee created in the House specif-
ically to conduct sunset reviews.29' It is not within the scope of this
Article, however, to explore the success or failure of the sunset con-
cept altogether, but to register disenchantment with the concept
287. Id. at 68-69.
288. Id. at 67.
289. Id. at 78.
290. Id. at 78-79.
291. Fla. HB 1683 passed 114 to 0 in the House, FLA. H.R. JouR. 1187 (Reg. Sess. June 1,
1988), and 31 to 0 in the Senate, FLA. S. JouR. 568 (Reg. Sess. May 31, 1988).
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mainly as it relates to the motor vehicle manufacturer regulatory pro-
gram.
V. CONCLUSION
The Legislature can do many things upon receiving a sunset recom-
mendation to allow the reviewed statute to repeal. It can allow the
statute to repeal. The Legislature has twice elected not to do this. Al-
ternatively, it can reenact the existing statute. The Legislature has sim-
ilarly twice elected not to do this. The Legislature can also reenact the
statute as amended. This is how the Legislature has twice responded.
The Legislature, however, has not amended the statute to render it
less restrictive and more competitive as contemplated by sunset, but
has expanded state regulation of the motor vehicle manufacturer-
dealer relationship and rendered the already restrictive statute even
more restrictive. Notwithstanding the collage of evidence indicating
that franchise provisions in general, and the entry restriction in partic-
ular, benefit incumbent franchised dealers to the detriment of the new
motor vehicle buying public, the Legislature has understandably
heeded the concerted effort of the impressive in-state motor vehicle
dealers' lobby to not only reenact the statute but also, in 1980 and in
1988 in particular, to amend the statute to greatly benefit one element
of the motor vehicle industry, the dealers, at the expense of the public
the process was intended to protect. As a consequence, a process care-
fully crafted to purge the law books of special interest legislation that
may creep into the statutes has been reduced to a periodic state-spon-
sored forum which triggers such legislation.
The ironic result is compounded by the cost incurred by the Legisla-
ture in conducting sunset review. A single Senate sunset report costs
almost $11,000, a report apparently not host to serious consideration.
Although the House sunset reviews are typically more abbreviated and
less costly, this amount could easily be doubled to acknowledge the
time spent by the staff and legislators in workshops, follow-up con-
tacts, and in considering and preparing amendments.
The problem created by the Legislature's repeated response can be
remedied by simply refusing to subject to sunset review a statute
clearly entrenched in the books. Thirty-five states, including Florida,
provide for sunset review of selected regulatory statutes. Of the forty-
six states regulating motor vehicle manufacturers, only four, including
Florida, have provided for sunset review of such statutes. The rest,
for whatever reasons, 292 have declined to go through similar well in-
292. An obvious reason may be the perceived inappropriateness of the sunset concept as it
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tended, but at best, unproductive, motions. The Florida Legislature,
to spare itself the unintended irony and waste resulting from sunset
review of the motor vehicle manufacturer licensing statute, could sim-
ply rejoin the majority by repealing the provision scheduling the stat-
ute for automatic repeal and a third sunset review in 1998. In the
Legislature they say, in the elevators, the hallways, and the stairwells,
as if it has to, "What goes around, comes around." But it does not
have to.
applies to motor vehicle manufacturer regulatory programs. As noted, 46 state legislatures have
allied themselves with the dealers to enact the franchise provisions and the courts have repeatedly
endorsed this special interest legislation as necessary to protect the dealers in their business rela-
tionship with the manufacturers. It could be suggested that it is neither meaningful nor satisfying
to insist that a legislature then inquire into the public purpose of such provisions; a statute
clearly enacted to protect an element of an industry will not survive a sunset review focused on
the public benefit of such legislation if the statute does not even coincidentally benefit the public.
